Self-Determination and Decentralisation in the Caribbean: TOBAGO and NEVIS

This study analyzes the movements for self-determination in two Caribbean countries, Nevis in St. Kitts-Nevis and Tobago in Trinidad and Tobago, from the perspective of the regional factor as a fundamental feature, complemented and strengthened by secondary factors, such as neglect and exploitation.¹ In many decentralist and separatist movements, ethnic uniqueness and identity serve as the main predisposing precipitator of claims for autonomy.² In both Nevis and Tobago, however, this factor is not etched in racial distinctiveness. Nevis and Trinidad's population is almost wholly of African-descent. Their assertion for some sort of self-determination is intermixed with claims of cultural uniqueness as well as other causes. These involve regional distinctiveness and historical problems that allegedly bred economic neglect and discrimination. Further, neither Nevis nor Tobago has always been a part of St.Kitts or Trinidad. The British colonizers welded them together for administrative convenience. The forced marriage has not always been a happy one, providing fodder for memory that sustains recurrent claims for selfhood. In recent times, in fact, these grievances have once again resulted in organized assertions in Tobago and Nevis for extensive autonomy, even territorial sovereignty.

In Tobagonian and Nevisian self-determination, the regional factor is salient in the quest to redefine the state so that the movement for self-determination in these islands can be analytically termed "ethno-regional". Anthony D. Smith has discussed this regional factor:

What is important and critical is the difference between 'ethnic' and 'territorial' separatism. In the latter case, the basis of the unit and its leaders' sense of apartness is geography. There are other differences like color or dialect, but the separatist movement is ultimately staking its claim in virtue of its remoteness and territorial distinctiveness of their unit.³

Socio-economic factors, such as neglect, discrimination and unequal development, may also be relevant to the regional nature of the problem as well as historical factors, so that a powerful separatist potion may be created from this combination of forces.⁴ The crux of the problem pertains to the establishment of a generally acceptable, just, and democratic government in the midst of deeply distrusting communal components in these states. Implicated are vexing issues related to status and recognition of sub-state ethno-regional and ethno-cultural communities which express fears of discrimination and domination as well as charges of discriminatory skewed state policies regarding resource allocation. Ethno-regional and ethnonational movements refer to sub-state groups in heterogenous multi-ethnic states set apart by self-conscious and self-ascribed cultural and other characteristics which are politically mobilized to address collective grievances against the state. When frustrated in their quest for recognition and resources, they generally challenge the very political and territorial definition of the state; they demand self-determination as Ted Gurr noted: "Their main political objective is 'exit', that is, they proactively pursue independent statehood or extensive regional autonomy".⁵

Short of destroying the state, the basic task is to design a framework of government that will accommodate the divergent claims of the respective communities for equity and autonomy, the way they see it. The aim of this paper is precisely pointed at the problems and possibilities of designing such a system. Our task is to look at those institutions and practices which seem to work in establishing some sort of modus vivendi for co-existence of these communities. Many of the solutions that work tend to be short term and ad hoc.

Self-Determination, Decentralization and Secession

It will be useful to discuss the notion of self-determination, decentralization and secession before the two cases are described and analyzed in detail.

a. Self-Determination

The claim to sovereign autonomy in a separate state runs into a series of doctrines which both affirm and deny that right. The United Nations Charter seems to do exactly this. The self-determination principle has become firmly enshrined in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter: "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development". The idea of "peoples' attracted some controversy but seemed to have settled down to refer to any self-differentiating group that makes a claim to a separate cultural identity. Charles Tilly thus argues: "Each distinct, homogenous people has a right to political autonomy, each to its own state".⁶ While part of the UN Charter seems to legitimize the right of a people for statehood, another part, Article 6, argues for the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state: "Any attempt aimed at a partial or whole disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations". The matter of defining precisely what is a people, homogenous or diversified, in a particular territory, small or large, with or without economic self-sufficiency and viability, had been a source of much debate historically.

The logic of the self-determination principle in sanctioning the demand of each people for its own state, embedded doctrinally in the nature of the state as it has evolved, has been the source of territorial fragmentation accompanied with mass expulsions and genocide not merely with the claims of the Third World states after WWII but this has been the case since the French Revolution. There have been waves of self-determination drives ever since the inception of the nation-state as an unit of national and international social organization. With the fall of the multi-ethnic great empires run by the Turks, the Hapsburgs, and the Russians, the cultural fragments sought separate destinies in acts of self-determination. Practically all of the globe was under European imperial control where new states after the European model were engrafted willy nilly on ethnically diverse populations. In these territories, self-determination drives for freedom were enacted one after the other especially after WWII. They went through two distinct stages: first a claim for independence using the colonial administrative boundaries as the territorial units for autonomy. The colonies of St. Kitts-Nevis and Trinidad and Tobago did this as a single unit. Second, after independence, the further claim of internal ethno-cultural and ethno-regional communities for autonomy. This is what Nevis and Tobago are now enacting.

Among the nearly all the communities seeking independent statehood, a major source of ethno-national assertions has been "uneven development". Tom Nairn, Immanuel Wallerstein, Ernest Gellner, and others have argued that the process of change had left behind a number of groups and regions which for one reason or the other had failed to be equally incorporated or assimilated.⁷ These groups and regions argued that they had faced discrimination and prejudice and had not benefitted equally but remained as regional and cultural distinct minorities, feeling marginalised in the new order of independence. In all these cases of uneven economic and political development, the resurgence of sub-nationalist assertions in many parts around the world can be traced. The cases of Nevis and Tobago in part illustrate this pattern.

b. Decentralization and Internal Autonomy

One of the common devices recommended as a means of managing claims and conflict between an ethno-political groups and a state is decentralized internal autonomy. Often this refers to territorial self governing autonomy either articulated in a federal arrangement or constitutionally entrenched into the organization of an unitary state. There are other possible forms such as some sort of functional autonomy in which representation of corporate communal interests in national decision-making bodies may be envisaged. Regardless, the fundamental assumption is that the devolution of autonomous decision-making powers to a sub-state community creates in the diffusion of authority separate space and confers recognition in self-governing pride. It is pre-eminently a political arrangement. It may successfully serve to foster a culture and protect the identity of a people in the end appeasing secessionist impulses, although equally, it may set the stage for ever increasing demands culminating in the surge for sovereignty.

Generally, decentralized autonomy to be credible or meaningful tends to be extensive in the devolution of both administrative and political powers. Decentralization therefore does not refer to the mere shuffling of the pack but in a more appropriate metaphor results in the flattening of the pyramid of power. It is a zero-sum game in which the loss of power at the center is accompanied by gain at the regional level. Decentralization of this kind is rarely conceded peacefully and for this reason it is not frequently found among states.⁸ In nearly all cases, decentralization is undertaken with a view to localizing and legitimating national rule. However, balancing the demand by minorities for maximum internal autonomy with the insistence of the central government for unequivocal loyalty is frequently an issue that threads on a razor's edge. Issues of financial autonomy, like the quantum of devolved powers, are likely sources of ongoing center-regional tugs of war. The uneven endowment of natural resources and disparities in levels of economic development among regions as well as different industriousness and achievements of the different peoples in the regionally diverse state tend to engender frequent inter-governmental disputes and resentments which can erupt into demands for exit. There are numerous other potentially tempestuous torrents that can break the bounds of reason and fatally buffet the devolution design including the right of residence by ethnic others within the territory of devolved community; exclusive ethnic preferences in allocating jobs, contracts, loans, subsidies, in other words, internal discrimination against minorities in the autonomous region; denial of individual rights in favor of group rights suitable for some persons and communities but not others, etc. In effect, there is endemic jurisdictional tension in the two trajectories in decentralization, one tending towards centrifugal ends and the other towards centripetal interests.

The autonomy strategy for assuaging and managing ethnic difference and communal identity may not therefore be a simple proposition. Besides it tends to be costly and wasteful in setting up parallel political and administrative structures as well as harboring and nurturing rival bases of power to the national government. It may conceal and protect inefficiency and corruption and local authoritarian practices under the rubric of a sacred decentralist ideology of self-determination. Ultimately, it survives or dies not on the architectural elegance or structural features of the center-regional organizational form but on trust that the region will not take the next inviting step to independence and the central authorities will not see every assertive act of internal autonomy as disloyalty requiring rapid and invasive intervention. This point is exemplified by the case of the Tamil quest for Eelam in Sri Lanka where deeply distrust has torpedoed even the most reasonable organizational concessions for decentralization. There are many variants of this problem often resolved by routinizing regular meetings of heads of regions and the federal government as well as establishing a permanent secretariat to oversee the implementation of the decentralization del. The manner of dispute resolution in ongoing center-periphery claims is critical. If mismanaged, disagreements can easily become bogged down in intransigent and irrational behavior which can witness threats of secession that may destabilize and engulf other regions and capsize the entire order. This occurred most recently in Papua New Guinea involving the island of Bougainville where a civil war has been in progress for almost a decade.⁹

Decentralization has many exposed and vulnerable parts of sensitivity both of a symbolic and material nature. Territory is a sacred entity often embodied emotively as a "homeland" or "motherland" and which easily combusts into militancy under the slightest of imagined violation.¹⁰ For these reasons, some analysts do not regard devolution as a useful but a dangerous device for managing and accommodating ethnic diversity. They often prefer accommodation via a system of guaranteed constitutionally entrenched special rights; corporate representation in the national legislature; or constitutional group rights while preserving the unitary structure of the state. In part, these measures have the virtue at once of conferring recognition of group rights as well as decreasing the likelihood of isolating an ethic community in an enclave in which separatist politics tend to fester. Territorial decentralization may militate against the growth of unifying bonds with other communities it is often argued but countered by the riposte that by protecting the identity of a community, such decentralization may enable a minority to evolve confidence and dignity enabling a healthier relationship with other groups.

c. Secession

Secession like divorce is an ultimate act of alienation. Committed against an existing state, successful secession results in the emergence of an international unit possessing all the attributes of an independent state - territory, people, government, and sovereign autonomy. Or as a temporary measure, may settle for internal self-government within an extensively decentralized system such as a federal or confederal state. While occupying the intermediate condition as a protected autonomous entity within an extensively decentralized sovereign state, the movement tends to continue to articulate the desire for a separate and independent destiny with these two goals oscillating between moments of satisfied accommodation and periodic bursts of renewed determination for outright secession. In the end, the objective remains constant - exit completely. Separatism may be conceived broadly as a quest for autonomous survival either within or without a state; secession strictly speaking is a variant of separatism in which the secessionists seek outright separation and independence in a sovereign state.

The quest for self-determination by a community within a plural state is often caught up in upheaval. As an act of territorial and political assertion, a secessionist struggle is usually prolonged, punishing, and prohibitively costly. In part this stems from the fact that hardly any state (with the rare exception of St. Kitts and Nevis) has established a legal and constitutional process for a community leaving peacefully. The idea of dismantling the state is not given a second thought; the state in its unity is deemed eternal. It is therefore usual for the demands of secessionist movements to be resisted, conceded with utmost reluctance, more often described as demonic, dealt with by fierce counter force, and deemed traitorous, and deserving of destruction. In instances where the confrontation has degenerated into open warfare, however badly beaten and savagely brutalized, rarely are secessionist assertions totally and finally annihilated. At times, in seeming defeat, they may appear moribund and may even be forgotten in the preoccupation with other problems, but over time, given the right circumstances, these movements will likely be awakened in all of their old fury. It comes and goes, ebbs and flows, unsurrendering from generation to generation, in a logic of their own. They die hard if ever.

As a social process, secession may be conceived analytically as constituted of steps and stages, cumulative and precipitating causes, periodically displaying patterns of accommodation and intransigence. A secessionist drive may originate in nothingness in a fabricated and mythical claim built around an invented self-differentiating group, but when mobilized its energies and objectives are real and become a menace that threatens to dismember a material pre-existing state. More often than not, its target of territorial autonomy is met with expressions of incredulity from central authorities if not outright denial of the authenticity of the claims of the separatist community their leaders described and dismissed as power hungry, demagogic and manipulative of public opinion in their community.¹¹ In 1993 the peaceful "velvet" separation of the Czechs and Slovaks in the former Czechoslovakia was a rare exception. Few are the cases if any where the parties are not joined in their struggle by foreign interests or states with their own agenda more often than not adding fuel to the sustenance of the struggle. This is the sad tale of secessionist movements as a whole regardless of the legitimacy and authenticity of their claims. They describe cases where procedures for departure are non-existent but do not suggest that missing procedures alone can concoct denial of the claim for secession. Ultimately, the matter may be one of power.

Nevis: The Right to Self-Determination

As part of the St. Kitts-Nevis federation in the Caribbean, Nevis with about 9,000 souls on an island area of 93.2 sq.kms., had repeatedly over the years expressed the desire to secede and become a sovereign state. If, at some time in the future, should Nevis succeed in this aim, it would become the smallest state in the Western Hemisphere and one of a few micro-states in the world including Tuvalu and Nauru with about 10,000 inhabitants. In its first attempt, the matter came to a head when on October 23, 1997, all members of the Nevis Island Assembly, government and Opposition alike, voted unanimously in support of a Bill for Nevis secession from St. Kitts. St. Kitts, the larger of the two entities in the twin island state, is itself a mini-state with about 33,000 persons occupying an area of 168.4 sq.kms. and which is within visual distance of Nevis. For the political governors of Nevis, size must not be uncritically equated with viability in the modern world at the end of the twentieth century, and in itself, they argue, it is of less consequence than the quality of the population and its economic structure. Commented the Premier of Nevis, Vance Amory:

...small size is not the issue. The critics speak of small size because they think you need to have masses of people who will work in factories. We have passed that stage. We are now in the what you might call the third millennium which is the Information Age and information depends on education. It depends on technology, not on mass production in small countries like ours. We have to use the advantage of our high levels of education, high levels of computer literacy, and technology to make the economy and society of Nevis viable and sustainable, and I think we are at that point.¹²

Nevisian separatists argue that they have a right to self-determination and independence. This has been affirmed at different times by both government and opposition on Nevis. The demand for separation aimed against integration with St.Kitts has been a persistent theme for over a century and a half. In the post World War period, there was a brief period when the decolonization demand for independence drew both Nevis and St. Kitts together under the same party led by Kittisian Robert Bradshaw. That seemed to have been a short passing phase however. In the 1960s, that party link with St. Kitts was broken and thereafter all parties in Nevis which sought popular Nevisian political support was required affirm the ritual of demanding Nevisian self-determination. No party controlling the Nevis local government body has been able to do so without pummelling Kittisian domination and exploitation. St.Kitts has become "the Other", demonised to assert Nevisian distinctness even at the cost of inventing some negative traits assigned to Kittisians. In the early 1980s when the Nevis Reformation Party which had won the support of Nevisians since its birth in 1970 by militantly advocating secession and had in fact come to be seen as the party of secession agreed at the London Independence Constitutional Conference to abandon its separatist platform and join St. Kitts in a federal union, it was later thrown out of power. In the 1996 elections for the Nevis Island Assembly, the CCM led by Vance Amory who at one time advocated constitutional reform retained power based on its platform calling for separation. The call for separation legitimizes power and authority in Nevis.

The assertion of the right to secession has been articulated clearly by Premier Amory arguing that as a separate people, Nevisians alone have the right to determine their destiny:

...ultimate responsibility for the welfare of Nevisians rests with Nevisians. Who can shape the destiny of Nevis better than Nevisians - those who are born here and those who have adopted this fair land as their home? Who else but Nevisians can determine the direction in which Nevis must go? Who but Nevisians can direct the future of our island? who, if not us, can achieve and celebrate our own independence?¹³

It is important to remember that Amory was not an original secessionist but had in fact at one point dismissed secession on the grounds that Nevis lacked the necessary infrastructure to sustain sovereignty. In the 1992 elections when Amory and the CCM won power from the NRP, it did not run primarily on a secessionist platform. However, in 1996, the CCM made secession its sole platform and was re-elected with a wide margin. The NRP which was born and prospered by invoking and nurturing secession for Nevis paradoxically had come to play down secession which was taken up in full cry by the CCM. In the past, however, the NRP had laid the main ideological and doctrinal basis for secession so that the CCM had merely to build on it.

The Nevisian secessionists of 1999 elaborated on the claims which were articulated by the NRP. For them, unless Nevis is reconfigured as a separate political entity in its own sovereign state, she will lack the ability to matter at all. Commented former Nevis cabinet member Colin Tyrell: "Nevisians must recognize that until and unless we stand up and do the right thing, that is formally establish our independence, Nevis will never feature in the scheme of things".¹⁴ Apart from dignified recognition from others, Nevis' independence, promises according to Premier Amory, to "heighten the clarity with which we identify who we are as a people".¹⁵ Sovereignty will foster pride in being Nevisian, continued Amory. The persistence of the association with St.Kitts, its larger omnipresent looming partner, threatens to submerge and damage Nevisian self image especially because of tits smaller and secondary size as well as the belittling manner in which Kittisians hold Nevisians. Independence is therefore critical for identity survival and affirmation. This apart, a separate state would permit Nevis to govern itself with accountability only to external agency and "enhance our ability to enter into agreements for developing regionally and internationally".¹⁶

The date set for the referendum was August 3, 1998. The referendum was peacefully carried out but it failed to give Nevis the requisite 66.6% or two thirds majority with the YES side obtaining only 61.7% of the votes cast. This meant that the referendum lost by less than two hundred votes but, by virtue of obtaining a substantial majority of popular support, communicated the existence of a strong undercurrent of sentiment against continued association between St. Kitts and Nevis. Said the defeated but defiant Premier of Nevis, Vance Amory:"...no one should forget that 62% of the persons who voted on the referendum did so in its support and that it was a significant recognition of the issue of independence for Nevis... [and] that Section 113 of the St.Kitts-Nevis constitution could still be used in future."¹⁷

The result of the referendum does not permanently settle the conflict between Nevis and the St.Kitts-Nevis federation. It is not in the nature of ethno-regional and ethno-cultural movements to simply disappear after an intial failed effort at gaining independence. The pragmatic grievances are only one aspect of the body of sentiments which have structured Nevis' demand for separation. Prime Minister Douglas and Premier Amory have both suggested that they would seek to reconcile the differences even though they individually see the main issues differently. What is more critical than the so-called pragmatic issues whether they relate to resource allocation or the institutional process of consultation - and Douglas seems to think that the problem in part stems from the failure to consult regularly and wants to have a mechanism to make periodic meetings compulsory - the primordial bases of Nevisian pride and identity remain in the realm of the irreconcilable. Some may argue that even in the intangible area of identity, concessions which accord adequate recognition to the pride of Nevisians as a people will suffice to maintain the unity of the federation. In some cases, recognition and respect for the cultural symbols and identity needs of a subordinate or minority people can serve to keep them from seceding. Also, it may be argued that a system of extensive decentralised autonomy may satisfy a sub-state community so that it remains loyal to the entirety of the state. In some cases, these work and in others they do not. What is however clear is that in the presence of competitive democratic politics both at the federal and especially at the local level, outbidders inevitably arise to instigate complaints which trigger the old desire to secede. Ethno-nationalist politics do not need reasonable arguments or accurate facts to become a credible force of mass mobilisation. Nevisian politicians have found that the appeal to Nevisian pride combined with allegations of discrimination and inequity however accurate constitute a sure potion to win power. The NRP did it as did the CCM. There is no sure solution to ethno-regional and ethno-cultural assertions any where in the world.

Tobago

Of all the cases for autonomy and separatism in the Caribbean, Tobago, which is one small part (about 6% in territory) of the twin-island state of Trinidad and Tobago, with population of about 1,300,000 (1990) and measuring 5,148 km., has been the most persistent in seeking some type of self-government. This part of the paper analyzes the Tobagonian autonomist movement from the perspective of the regional factor as a fundamental feature, complemented and strengthened by secondary factors, such as neglect and exploitation.¹⁸

Unlike Trinidad with has Africans and Indians in almost equal numbers, Tobago is almost wholly populated by persons of African descent. While in many self-determination movements ethnic cleavage serves as the main precipitator of claims for uniqueness,¹⁹ in Tobago, as in Nevis, however, this factor is weak. Tobago's claim for autonomy involves regional distinctiveness and historical problems that bred economic neglect and discrimination. Further, Tobago has not always been a part of Trinidad. The British colonizers welded them together for administrative convenience as in Nevis. And as in Nevis, the forced marriage, has not always been a happy one. In recent times, in fact, these grievances have resulted in oblique and periodically open assertions in Tobago for outright separation.

The history of Tobago compares to that of most of the West Indian islands, in that its colonizers developed the socioeconomic structure to satisfy the needs of plantation owners. Each island had its own monocultural economy producing mainly sugar, and depended on a cheap source of labour. In the nineteenth century, Tobago had considerable economic and strategic importance for most European powers. After 1802, when Tobago, together with Trinidad, became a British possession, it proved one of the most prosperous sugar islands and assumed greater importance in British colonial policy than Trinidad. The governor of Trinidad considered his transfer to Tobago a promotion. According to Eric Williams, Tobago was in a state of "betweenity," transferred from country to country, changing national flags and political allegiance with consummate ease.²⁰ But by the early 1880s, Tobago's prosperity had evaporated, thanks to stiff competition from European beet sugar growers, and the imposition in Great Britain of the Sugar Duties Act of 1846. In 1889, the British Government linked Tobago, formerly part of the Windward Islands, with Trinidad as a single colony. The Tobagonian plantocracy objected strenuously to this forced merger, but could not dispute the decision because of the bankrupt state of the island's economy. The final and most humiliating blow came when Tobago became Trinidad's ward in 1898. This administrative act was designed to unify the economies and governments of the two islands, and hasten the flow of Trinidadian resources and capital to Tobago in order to revive its ailing economy. This union has been described variously as a forced marriage and as an act of imperialism, which nobody in Tobago and Trinidad desired at the time. Tobago's autonomists have been citing this forced unification with Trinidad as one of the injustices perpetrated by colonialism. Separatists elsewhere have made similar claims of "false unity" and "juggling of colonial territories."²¹

The alleged uniqueness of a group legitimizes its demand for self-determination.²² Tobagonians claim that they are unique, because their lifestyle revolves around the village, which has maintained important aspects of its ancestral African features of collectivism, as opposed to the rugged individualism or the capitalism characteristic of Western societies.²³ In Tobagonian society, family and kinship ties are very important. While Trinidad has a cosmopolitan, divided and urbanized society, Tobago's society is homogeneous and relatively cohesive. Tobagonians can rightfully claim that theirs is a separate and distinct culture, the values of which differ significantly from those of Trinidadians. Tobagonian vocabulary contains certain terms that are alien to the Trinidadians' vernacular of creolized English. In this regard, both Nevisians and Tobagonians share similar claims about their unique culture in contrast to St. Kitts and Trinidad respectively.

As in the case of Nevis, non-primordial variables on which the demand for autonomy is based are alleged economic neglect, discrimination, and exploitation. Tobago separatists assert that decades of British and Trinidadian misrule and benign neglect had left the island in a backward state.

Tobago, along with the smaller West Indian islands, was too small to derive any benefits from the new blueprint in industrialization as advocated by Sir Arthur Lewis. Its limited size (302 km²) and inconsequential internal market disqualified Tobago from participating in the new national policy of industrial development in the 1950s and 1960s. Like other small Caribbean islands, Tobago concentrated on tourism and small-scale agriculture and lacks an industrial sector. The formerly vibrant farming sector in Trinidad virtually collapsed as new industries attracted workers with the lure of higher wages. The growth of the public sector in Tobago also had a similar effect so that by 1970, it accounted for 56% of all paid employees.²⁴ Tourism proved incapable of compensating for the slack, as envisaged, because too many commodities had to be imported. In the post-1945 period, Tobago's development became stifled, because the industrial policy favoured Trinidad at the expense of Tobago. In 1956, the PNM, the main proponent of this policy, had come to power. But overall, the party sought to conciliate Tobago, and Dr. Eric Williams, its leader, promised a fair deal for Tobago.

Williams acknowledged that Tobago had endured many years of neglect, evidenced by the decline of its agricultural sector. He asserted that "Tobago had exchanged the neglect of United Kingdom imperialism for the neglect of Trinidad imperialism."²⁵ Williams believed that Tobago could not be treated as if it were Caroni, or some other county in Trinidad. Tobago, in his view, was a special case. In 1957, the government increased Tobago's development funding to $13 million, which exceeded what the island had received in the previous hundred years. Williams also committed his government to provide to the people of Tobago the same services and opportunities that were available in Trinidad.²⁶ He created a separate Ministry of Tobago Affairs, and provided for the appointment of a special administrator with wide powers. The electorate in Tobago elected the PNM in 1958, and again in 1961.

By 1970, however, it was obvious that all was not well in Tobago. The repercussion of the Black Power Movement which rocked the PNM Government in 1970 was not limited to Trinidad alone and was quite strong in Tobago. Many Tobagonians resented the fact that 60% of the land in Tobago was owned by mainly local Whites. Prime Minister Williams' deputy, A.N.R. Robinson, resigned his position in the Party and the government in the aftermath of the February Revolution of 1970. At this point, trouble stirring in Trinidad's sister isle, Tobago, became noticeable. Tobago-born Robinson formed the Action Committee of Dedicated Citizens (ACDC), which became the Democratic Action Congress (DAC) after the 1971 General Elections. Robinson's ACDC, in coalition with the Indian-backed Democratic Labour Party in Trinidad, boycotted the 1971 elections to protest the introduction of voting machines. Then, in the 1976 general elections, the Democratic Action Congress (DAC) shocked the PNM by winning Tobago's two seats. Two cabinet ministers representing these two constituencies had to resign the first time that PNM cabinet ministers had been defeated since the party's formation in 1956.

The DAC electoral victory was a crucial turning point in Tobago's autonomy movement. What had previously been a simmering and quiet resentment within Tobago boiled over, as the electorate rejected the PNM. Williams asserted that if his government was a burden on the people of Tobago, then "it was the most costly imposition in Caribbean history."²⁷ Williams said to Tobagonians, "if you want to go, go. We are not holding you," and continued to ignore the growing desire of the people of Tobago for the right to manage their own affairs. Reliance on the generosity of the central government made them feel dependent and inferior in their own land. Much of these sentiments were borne out by objective facts. These included the need of Tobagonians to travel to Trinidad at great expense to obtain government services such as copies of birth certificates, land and court documents, etc. A highly centralised state apparatus headquartered in Port of Spain, daily reminded Tobagonians of their peripheral condition. These were echoes of Nevis' own grievances against St. Kitts.

It was fairly apparent by 1976 that Tobago had had its fill of twenty years of PNM rule. The fact that the country was enjoying its most prosperous years as the result of an oil boom created by the energy crisis of 1973 accentuated and exacerbated Tobago's problems in relation to Trinidad. According to Robinson, while capital expenditures on Tobago increased by under 50% in the period between 1970 and 1975, the price index rose by over 75%. During the same period, the revenue of Trinidad and Tobago multiplied fourfold.²⁸ Tobago's economy remained backward, whereas Trinidad's advanced. This backwardness manifested itself in several forms. For example, Tobago had virtually no self-generating investment that could be ploughed back into building new productive facilities. It had little access to non-governmental capital as well as new technology. Most of its manufactured goods were imported at inflationary prices from Trinidad's capital, Port of Spain. Cost of living in Tobago was 20-25% higher than in Trinidad. Tobago suffered from a higher unemployment rate than Trinidad - 10% among heads of households and 50% among all other occupants. It lacked post-secondary educational institutions, and its public administration was inefficient. Some three-quarters of Tobago's annual population growth of 850 departed the island in search of jobs and higher education, mainly in Trinidad. The DAC contended that, with all these problems, Tobago should not be compared favourably with several small islands of the Caribbean as the PNM administration had tried to do to justify the neglect. Rather, as Robinson argued, Tobago was Trinidad's and the Caribbean's Third World, because it was always compared with the least advantaged states of the Caribbean. Tobago felt both neglected and discriminated against. After the 1976 general elections, Tobago's problems magnified, because the PNM government reacted truculently to the loss of its Tobago seats.

After 1976, the central government dismantled the Ministry of Tobago Affairs, which left the island without an administrative organization to oversee its affairs. This resulted in utter chaos, as many public servants worked for several months without being remunerated. This action, more than any other, demonstrated to Tobagonians how dependent their island had become on the whimsical authority of Port of Spain. At about the same time, the shipping service between Port of Spain and Scarborough, Tobago's capital, deteriorated. The government had bought a second-hand ferry from Venezuela for $10 million to sail the 32km distance between the two ports. The ship however broke down soon after its inaugural voyage before the 1976 elections. Tobago merchants could not get their goods on time, and shortages ensued. Many Tobagonians attributed their own suffering to Tobago's anti-PNM vote in the previous general elections. The Trinidad Express claimed that nobody in Tobago really wanted to separate from Trinidad.²⁹ According to The Express, starvation was a strong weapon in wartime, and in peacetime the threat of it took the winds out of the sail of any budding secessionist movement in Tobago.

The DAC platform called for full internal self-government within the unitary state of Trinidad and Tobago. The main concern of the autonomy movement was to win the right to run its own affairs and the argument centred around the issue of harnessing the economic institutions and resources of Tobago for the benefit and welfare of Tobagonians in particular and the country in general.³⁰

Robinson introduced a resolution in the 1977 Parliament that called for self-government for Tobago. His resolution clearly stated that the granting of internal self-government must not negate the constitutional reality of the independent unitary state.³¹ The PNM attempted to sidetrack the issue by remanding Robinson's resolution to a Joint Select Committee of Parliament. In its submission to this committee, the DAC categorically denied that it was seeking secession. It cited several characteristics of Tobago's neglect, including the lack of communication between Tobago and the rest of the world, the high cost of living compared to Trinidad, inefficient public utilities, and the lack of a resident judge on the island. The DAC traced these problems to the failure of the colonial solution of 1898, the dismantling of the Ministry of Tobago Affairs in 1977, and the lack of a permanent governmental structure that was independent of party politics. Tobago also lacked representation at the senate and cabinet levels. Thus, the movement for internal self-government arose because these alleged injustices persisted, and due to the influence and role of political leaders such as A.N.R. Robinson and Dr W. Murray, both of whom sought constitutional and legal guarantees in the national parliament to ensure Tobagonian self-determination.

The PNM government decided to accept the Robinson resolution calling for internal self-government in Tobago, albeit with some amendments. It did so, despite having a large parliamentary majority, because it feared the growth of influence of extreme secessionists within the DAC who disagreed with Robinson's moderate approach. But a special PNM convention held in July 1977, ruled out internal self-government for Tobago. It called for the upgrading of all local government bodies and ordered special attention to be paid to administrative branches in Tobago, such as communications, shipping, and air services. Prime Minister Williams raised the possibility of foreign influence and intervention in the Tobago issue.³² He feared that Tobago's possible secession might affect the region's strategic balance, in which Trinidad played a major role.

The autonomy movement became fragmented when Murray formed a break-away party known as the Fargo House Movement, which was devoted to complete separation. Murray designed a Tobago national flag and proposed to raise it at a rally in Scarborough, the capital of Tobago.³³ This symbolic gesture characterised a growing frustration in Tobago over the PNM's intransigence on the issue of internal self-government. The PNM apparently hoped that Murray's extremism would complicate matters and divide the opposition. Robinson and his DAC retained most people's support for Tobago.

The Joint Select Committee had proven to be a fruitless instrument that had ignored the growing nationalist feelings of Tobago's people. This nationalism was deeply rooted in culture and tradition, but most especially in the frustrations of the past arising from many years of neglect. It soon became apparent that something more than what the Joint Select Committee envisaged would be necessary to quench the growing thirst of Tobago's people for self-determination.

Robinson and the DAC became extremely frustrated by the unwillingness of the PNM to implement the 1977 resolution for internal self-government. Robinson drafted his own government model for Tobago that envisaged a fifteen-member assembly headed by a chairman. It embraced the concept of revenue sharing, whereby all revenues earned in Tobago would be employed for Tobago's sole benefit. This assembly would be administered by public servants who were directly employed by the Assembly on contract or secondment from the central government. Robinson also envisioned a $200 million Treasury Fund and a $150 million Tobago Special Fund. This plan he presented at a public meeting in Scarborough during a 1979 May Day rally which thereupon demanded self-government for Tobago. Robinson did not exclude the possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence if the central government refused to agree to the demands of his party. In an interview with the Trinidad Guardian he asserted that, if self-government was impossible, "there is no alternative but complete separation and we will not shrink from it if it becomes necessary."³⁴

The enactment of the Tobago House of Assembly Act finally came on September 23, 1980 and led to rising expectation by many Tobagonians that their desire for autonomy was being fulfilled. These hopes yielded to great despair and rising frustration as the sessions of the Tobago House of Assembly were marred by continuous friction between the latter and the central government over the scope of the Assembly's power. The DAC controlled eight of the twelve seats after the 1980 Assembly elections. A.N.R. Robinson resigned his seat in the National Parliament to fight in the first franchise waged for the Tobago House of Assembly. He subsequently became Chairman of that body. The conflict arose over whether the Assembly was a policy-formulating body respecting specified matters relating to Tobago, or merely an administrative arm of the central government.³⁵ The PNM preferred the latter interpretation, because it still wished to exercise some control over Tobago affairs. The PNM had emasculated the Tobago House of Assembly leaving it with few autonomous powers. The DAC, on the other hand, believed that the Tobago House of Assembly should be a policy-formulating body with full financial powers, in keeping with the spirit of the initial 1977 Robinson resolution on internal self-government for Tobago.

Fundamentally, the issue was intensely political, caught up in a zero-sum game of power distribution and not simply a matter of devolving administrative duties to a peripheral unit of the government. Political gain for Tobago was a political loss for the PNM in the calculus of power. The High Court of Trinidad and Tobago agreed with the central government's interpretation of the Tobago House of Assembly Act, i.e. that the Ministry of Tobago Affairs was responsible for specific matters identified in the Act.

Once again, Tobagonians were frustrated in their efforts aimed at achieving self-determination. The DAC had attempted to function within the system by participating in Assembly elections. Its frustrations with the existing arrangements were reflected in the introduction by the DAC of a motion in the Tobago House of Assembly in 1983 which again raised the issue of secession. However, by then, secessionist sentiment had declined considerably. An opinion poll at the time revealed that only 7% of the people sampled wanted Tobago to secede from Trinidad. This decline in secessionist fervour was not reflected in diminished support for the DAC which was firmly embedded as the party of Tobago. In the 1984 Assembly elections, the DAC increased its margin of control from eight to eleven of the twelve seats, but the PNM still retained 42% of the popular vote. Between 1979 and 1984, the central government had increased development expenditures for Tobago from $39.4 million to $112.4 million. By 1983, recurrent expenditure amounted to $312.9 million. If money could have bought the votes of Tobagonians, the PNM would have won the elections many times over. But electors in Tobago were not concerned with how many millions were allocated to their Assembly, but whether they had the freedom to manage their own affairs and determine where and how the money was spent. Inherent in the quest for political autonomy were uncompromising symbolic issues dealing with communal dignity and self-worth. Under A.N.R. Robinson, the DAC retained the support of a majority of Tobagonians, who regarded that party as the vehicle through which Tobagonian self-determination could be achieved.

Tobago under a new Government

In 1986, A.N.R. Robinson, the DAC's political head, was elected as leader of a new national party, the National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR). The NAR was a conglomeration of several political parties in Trinidad and Tobago that included the DAC. When Robinson and the NAR defeated the PNM in national elections in Tobago in late 1986, the action halted secessionist politics for some time to come. The reason was that one of the main planks in the NAR's platform was self-government for Tobago. Robinson became the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, and was in the best possible position to implement his long-sought objective of self-government for Tobago within the unitary state of Trinidad and Tobago.

At last, it seemed that Tobago's travails under the PNM were at an end. In this regard, Tobago was not disappointed. Robinson, himself, who had equivocated about Tobago's self-determination and secessionist intentions, declared that he was always against the cause of separatism since 1958 arguing that the "moment you begin doing that, you are breaking up the whole country."³⁶ To some, even this renunciation of Tobagonian secession was tempered with a qualifier that Robinson subsequently uttered that "we subscribe to all the international treaties and covenants which recognise the right to self-determination." Regardless of its subtle long-term implication, Robinson proceeded to oversee the most remunerative expenditures of projects in Tobago. It may be recalled that expenditures for Tobago had peaked at TT$173 million in 1982 and declined to TT$112 million in 1984. During the new Robinson administration he oversaw the completion of the Scarborough Deep Water Harbour at the cost of nearly TT$100 million, the lengthening of the Crown Point Airport runway to accommodate jumbo jets flying directly into Tobago tourist resorts, the purchase of a new and very expensive ferry vessel connecting Tobago with Trinidad etc. Together, the massive and disproportionate budgetary tilt in favour of Tobago, which drew immense criticisms from the parliamentary opposition parties, was justified in the light of the long years of negligence in the development of Tobago. Apart from these material benefits, the Robinson regime amended the Tobago House of Assembly Act so as to bring the employees of the Tobago House of Assembly under the protection, pay, and privileges of the Central Government's Public Service Commission. In these material and constitutional ways, the needs of Tobago seemed to have received their just attention. Self-determination movements, however, are not creatures known to be permanently placated by pragmatic acts of appeasement.

Despite the fact that Robinson acceded to the Prime Minsitership of Trinidad and Tobago, the demand for more autonomy had not disappeared. In August 1989, a new autonomist agitational oranisation called "The Group with Tobago at Heart" or GROWTH, was launched by a group of educated and professional Tobagonians. GROWTH has attracted much national attention. Accused of being a secessionist organisation, Ms. Moore-Miggins, the lawyer-founder of GROWTH, denounced the charge as "a propaganda thing" because the word "secession" conjures negative images "of disruption and dislocation."³⁷ The language and themes of its criticisms of Tobago's relationship to Trinidad belong typically of separatist movements. Hence, GROWTH asserts that Tobago is "being treated as a colony" arguing that "[I]f history had taken its natural course, we would have today been running our own affairs as best as we could. So the call for independence is really a desire to keep a date with our history."³⁸ Ms. Moore-Miggins alleges that "every facet of life in Tobago - be it economic, political or social - is dictated, controlled, and stage-managed from Trinidad."³⁹ Alterations in the Tobago House of Assembly Act by the Robinson administration, according to Ms. Moore-Miggins, has failed to rectify the fact that Tobago still "does not control its own purse strings,"⁴⁰ and all "major financial decisions are made in Trinidad."⁴¹ She points out that Tobago does not have a resident judge for its 45,000 people, that "deeds and documents must be taken to Trinidad to be stamped and registered, etc."⁴² For GROWTH, all of this not only entails "a systematic belittlement" of one of Tobago's major indigenous institutions (The Tobago House of Assembly) but at the individual level it cultivates a "lack of self-esteem, of self-worth".⁴³ GROWTH however does not plan violent confrontation with the Central Government in Trinidad: "Protests, marches, and violent confrontations are alien to the make-up of most residents of Tobago."⁴⁴

On December 16, 1991, the government of ANR Robinson was overwhelmingly defeated in the general elections. The PNM, the old nemesis of Tobagonian autonomist aspirations had returned to power over the politically defeated corpse of Tobago's son of the soil, Robinson. This event occurred at a time when the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had disintegrated and their dismembered parts were engaged in conflicts to assert themselves as separate sovereign entities. The victory of the PNM had evoked the spectre of separatist revivalism in Tobago. One of the first major acts by the new PNM Prime Minister was a hurried visit to Tobago where he assured the elected leaders of the Tobago House of Assembly of "no vindictiveness, hatred, or disrespect" and an understanding of Tobago's sense of "discrimination and insecurity."⁴⁵ Manning promised to entrench the self-governing status of the Tobago House of Assembly in the country's constitution "in return for respect for the unitary state of Trinidad."⁴⁶ The PNM Prime Minister apologized to Tobago for the ill-feelings of the past, promised to deal with Tobagonian affairs himself instead of at a subordinate level, saying "I come to you with an olive branch. I come with a message of love, of hope, peace, and unity."⁴⁷ Within a short time of this overt act of public reconciliation, GROWTH protested that Manning had failed to include a single Tobagonian in his 21-person Cabinet in the new PNM Government. The Tobago House of Assembly would also protest against an alleged cut of its budgetary allocations from the central government. With Robinson out of power and back in Tobago, and with GROWTH actively agitating for more autonomy, many of the critical triggering ingredients may be in place to cause trouble between Trinidad and tobago in a familiar struggle between center and periphery over the primordial claim for self-determination.

The current claims for even more self-governing power for Tobago even after the major devolution of 1997 have once again placed Tobago's future up for grabs. New negotiations are afoot to provide Tobago with greater autonomy especially with regard to accessing international loans. This and other familiar issues continue to bedevil center-periphery relations between Tobago and Trinidad. Like Nevis, it is not clear that any combination of concessions in decentralization will ever quell the desire for self-determination.

Footnotes

1. For a discussion of these categories see Ralph R. Premdas, "Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective," in Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective edited by Ralph R. Premdas et al. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), 12-31.

2. See ibid. and also D. Horowitz, "Patterns of Ethnic Separatism, Comparative Studies in History and Society, Vol. 23, No.2, April 1981.

3. A.D. Smith, "Nationalism, Ethnic Separatism, and the Intelligentsia," in C. Williams, ed., National Separatism, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985).

4. C. Williams, "Introduction," in ibid. 1.

5. Ted R.Gurr, "Peoples Against States: Ethno-political Conflict and the Changing World System", International Studies Quarterly, 38, 1994, p. 354.

6. Charles Tilly, "National Self Determination as a Problem for all of Us", Daedalus, Summer, 1993, Vol 22, No.3, p. 28

7. See T. Nairn, The Breakup of Britain (London: New Left Books, 1977); see also, M.Hecter and M.Levi, "The Comparative Analysis of Ethno-Regional Movements", Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2/3, 1989, pp. 262-274.

8. See Ralph Premdas, "The Solomon Islands: The Experiment in Decentralization," Public Administration and Development, Summer, 1982; also H. Maddick, Democracy, Decentralization, and Development (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1996); and L. White, "Decentralization", Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. V, 1931, pp. 33-34.

9. See Ralph Premdas, "Secession and Decentralization; The Bougainville Case", Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, Winter, 1997.

10. See Steven Grosby, "Territoriality:The Transcendental, Primordial Feature of these Societies", Nations and Nationalism, July, 1995, pp. 145-6; also, Ralph Premdas, Ethnic Identity in the Caribbean: Decentering a Myth (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1996). Kellogg Institute of International Affairs, Monograph, no.234, pp. 12-20.

11. See Ralph Premdas, "Secession and Political Change:The Case of Papua Besena", Oceania, 47(4): 265-283.

12. See Valencia Grant, "It Will Be Business As Usual", The Observer, August 8-14, 1998, p. 4.

13. "Premier Amory Urges Participation in Nevis Constitution Committee", Observer(Nevis), 17-23, January, 1998, p. 5.

14. C.Tyrell, "Nevisians Need No More Threats", Observer, (Nevis),14-20 March, 1998, p. 29.

15. "Premier Amory Urges...", op.cit., p. 5.

16. "Premier Amory Urges.."., op.cit., p. 5.

17. "Section 113 Could Still Be Used in Future - Vance Amory", The Observer, 15-23 August, 1998, p. 1.

18. For a discussion of these categories see Ralph R. Premdas, "Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective," in Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective edited by Ralph R. Premdas et al. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), 12-31.

19. See ibid. and also D. Horowitz, "Patterns of Ethnic Separatism, Comparative Studies in History and Society, Vol. 23, No.2, April 1981.

20. Eric Williams, History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago (Lond.: 1964), p. 122.

21. Ralph R. Premdas, "Secessionist Politics in Papua New Guinea," Pacific Affairs, Vol. V, No.1, Spring 1977, 4.

22. Ibid., 6; see also, F. Barth, (ed.) Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (London: Little, Brown and Co., 1969).

23. J.G. Davidson, Tobago vs. The PNM Port of Spain, (Port of Spain, Trinidad: Beacon Publishing Co., 1977). See also C.R. Ottley, The Story of Tobago (Trinidad: Longman's, 1973).

24. Trinidad and Tobago Review, Vol.25 (July & August 1978), 6.

25. Davidson, Tobago, 40.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., 196.

28. Davidson, Tobago, 40.

29. Trinidad Express, (2 December 1977), 5.

30. Trinidad and Tobago Review, Vol.25, (July & Aug., 1978), 33.

31. Trinidad Guardian, 10 December 1977, 4.

32. Trinidad Guardian, 25 July, 1977, 1.

33. Trinidad Express, 10 December 1977, 5.

34. Trinidad Guardian, 3 May, 1979, 5.

35. Ryan, "Tobago's Quest," op. cit., 40.

36. "Putting Secession Talk Behind Us," Express, 10 October, 1989, 8.

37. D. Yawching, "Cry From the Heart," Trinidad and Tobago Review, Vol.39, March 1992, 13.

38. Deborah Moore-Miggins, "Case For Self-rule in Tobago," Guardian, 28 October 1990, 9.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Yawching, op. cit., 13.

42. Ibid.

43. Moore-Miggins, op. cit., 9.

44. Ibid.

45. "Let's Stay Together," Express, 8 January. 1992, 1.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

URL http://www.uwichill.edu.bb/bnccde/sk&n/conference/papers/RRPremdas.html