Few issues captured global attention in the 1980s and early 1990s as the virtual eruption of the illicit drug problem the world over. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) asserted early in this period that the problem had reached "unprecedented dimensions".1 No other conclusion could be drawn, given persistent reports of increased availability of narcotics raw materials, principally opiates, coca and cannabis, escalating drug abuse, the expansion of drug trafficking routes, particularly to areas not previously affected, and the abuse of psychotropic substances diverted from licit channels, illicitly manufactured or not yet under international control.
The emergence in some countries and regions of powerful, well-financed, heavily armed and ruthless drug trafficking syndicates was of particular global concern. Reaching across national borders, these syndicates perpetrated horrific acts of violence, including assassinations, and intimidated, bribed and corrupted. Their incentive to engage in this illicit business came from the enormous profits it returned, estimated to be in the billions of dollars annually,2 more than the national budget of numerous countries of the developing world. The threat to the economies, social and political systems and national security of affected countries, particularly developing countries, was exceptionally grave. Especially from the developing countries' perspective, vital resources needed for development had to be diverted to counter the illicit drug problem.
There seemed to be no logical reason for The Bahamas to be caught up in the spiral of drug abuse and illicit trafficking. It did not produce narcotic raw materials: no opiates, no coca and no cannabis. It had no pharmaceutical industry of the kind that would cause concern about the diversion of psychotropic substances from licit trade, and no history of clandestine laboratories for the production of illicit psychotropic substances. Alcohol abuse was admittedly a problem to be reckoned with, but not the abuse of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
It is The Bahamas' geography, specifically its archipelagic configuration, and its geographical location, its strategic location between source and supply centres of cocaine and cannabis in South America and the Caribbean and significant markets for illicit drugs in North America, that drew it unwittingly into the web of the illicit drug trade. Explaining these two essential facts to the international community in his address to the General Debate of the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1981, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon. Paul L. Adderley stated,
The Bahamas covers an area of almost 100,000 nautical square miles of water, with many isolated islands where ships and aircraft engaged in drug trafficking may seek haven to elude detection. The geographical location of The Bahamas also makes it a convenient transit country for illicit drugs destined for the big and profitable markets in North America.3
That international drug traffickers came to view The Bahamas as a natural conduit in their illicit drug delivery network from south to north is unquestionable. The key dimension of the drug problem in The Bahamas, therefore, was, as it continues to be today, illicit traffic in transit, and cocaine and cannabis the principal drugs in the traffic.
Assistant Superintendent Basil Dean of the Royal Bahamas Police Force explained to the thirty-first session of the CND in 1985 that early on, drugs were trafficked in mothership operations, with larger vessels transporting enormous cargoes into Bahamas territory, where they were offloaded into smaller craft for the journey northwards. International drug traffickers quickly developed and favoured an airdrop method. Drugs packed in water-tight bags were dropped from low flying aircraft to waiting ocean racing boats, for their onward journey. Cocaine was also flown to predetermined locations, usually private islands with airstrips, and transferred speedily to other aircraft and boats, then on to the markets of the north.4
Drug abuse and illicit trafficking, imperceptible in The Bahamas the 1960s and early 1970s rapidly developed into a serious human and national security challenge in the decades of the 1980s and beyond, as the exploitation of the country by international drug traffickers became a critical force to be reckoned with. To give an indication of the volume of the illicit transit traffic, Assistant Superintendent Dean informed the CND that in 1983, 316 tons of marijuana and 1.5 tons of cocaine had been seized in The Bahamas.5
The intensity and pace of the drug problem threatened to transform Bahamian society. By the mid-1980s, drug abuse was considered to have reached pandemic proportions and distortions were becoming evident in the socio-economic development processes. Drug related crime and criminality increased, and there was a significant draw down on the national budget to counter illicit drug trafficking. The Prime Minister of The Bahamas, the Rt. Hon. Lynden O. Pindling, confirming the enormity of The Bahamas budgetary outlays to the Commonwealth Heads of Government in Kuala Lumpur in 1989, stated,
The cost to The Bahamas has been high - 14% of our national budget goes to police and law enforcement agencies fighting drug trafficking and drug-related crimes spawned by trafficking.6
As a small island developing state with a population of less than 250,000 and with limited human, material, financial and other resources, The Bahamas was ill equipped to stem the tide of drug trafficking by well-financed and determined international drug traffickers. It is noteworthy, from this perspective, that the very factors that made the territory of The Bahamas a magnet for drug traffickers, its geography and geographical location, made policing it a formidable challenge for Bahamian law enforcement agencies. Notwithstanding, The Bahamas readily took up the challenge to combat drug abuse and illicit trafficking, both on its own and in cooperation with others, with its international obligations firmly in view.
The proposition that the greater part of the illicit transit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances into and through The Bahamas was destined for the United States could not be disputed, given the small size of The Bahamas population relative to the volume of the illicit drugs in the traffic, the large demand market in the United States and the proximity of the two countries. It followed logically that the close bilateral relations which The Bahamas and the United States have traditionally enjoyed would be turned to the efforts of close neighbours confronting the same deleterious trans-border problem. Views converged on the urgent need to control the illicit production, trafficking and abuse of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances affecting both countries in particular, and the Americas in general. Bahamas-United States cooperation in drug control began during this period has been maintained.
The critical aspect of the drug problem affecting The Bahamas on the one hand, and that affecting the United States, on the other, however, differed significantly. For The Bahamas, it was a phenomenonal illicit transit traffic, which put the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a small country in jeopardy, and threatened to engulf it in an abyss of drug addiction, crime and criminality, with far-reaching implications for virtually every aspect of its national development. For the United States, the pressing problem was one of enormous drug demand, and a resultant preoccupation with preventing further illicit narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances from reaching its shores. In the circumstances, some divergence in viewpoints about just how the fight against illicit drugs should be fought was inevitable.
It is not within the scope of this perspective to detail the differences that entangled, and too often deeply troubled relations between The Bahamas and the United Stats in the period under review. It has, however, been argued persuasively that allegations of complicity and corruption could often be construed into the substance and tone of the United States bilateral relations with The Bahamas, and in particular into its commentary on The Bahamas drug control efforts, machinery and polity. Thus, questions were raised both nationally and internationally about The Bahamas commitment to the drug fight.
It did not make good policy sense to point a finger at The Bahamas in the fight against illicit drugs, but it did make good press. This was evident from what appeared to be a crusade-like campaign waged against The Bahamas by the media in the United States and some other industrialised countries in the period under review. In the 1980s especially, many media reports, punctuated with speculation and misinformation, gave the impression that The Bahamas and its people had been corrupted by international drug traffickers from the top down, and as such, was contributing to the drug abuse problem of developed countries, particularly the United States.
What was blatantly missing from much of a barrage of biased reporting (in the main "investigative reporting") and the stereotypical portrait it painted of The Bahamas was an in-depth analysis of the root causes, dimensions and consequences of the drug problem. The principal engine propelling the illicit drug traffic was production and demand outside of The Bahamas. This was so not only for The Bahamas, but also for countries and territories throughout the Caribbean.
Media reports also tended to overlook other critical features of the illicit drug trafficking problem affecting The Bahamas. For most of the period under review, in particular, a significant part of this illicit business was in the hands of foreign nationals. In 1984, for example, persons from some 26 countries, most of them nationals of the United States, the country with the most significant illicit demand market, and Columbia, the country with the most significant source and supply centres for cocaine, were charged with drug offences in The Bahamas.7 Neither did most media reports recognize that The Bahamas was ill equipped to deal with the drug problem, lacking adequate machinery, manpower and resources. Further, reports rarely addressed the implications for The Bahamas of confronting powerful drug trafficking networks, or the debilitating impact of drug abuse, a consequence of the spill over from the illicit transit traffic.
The Bahamas Government appointed Commission to "Inquire into the Illegal Use of The Bahamas for Transhipment of Dangerous Drugs Destined for the United States of America", which met October 1983 to December 1984 did uncover some corruption and bribery in respect to the illicit drug trade transiting The Bahamas, but certainly not to the extent, nor at the level alleged.8 Notwithstanding, media reports and strident commentary on The Bahamas drug control efforts influenced international public opinion at home and abroad, with far-reaching implications for a country for which tourism and international banking constitute principal industries.
Early commentary on The Bahamas drug control efforts by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), a body of thirteen experts established under the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, to monitor and advise on the illicit drug problem worldwide, gave the distinct impression that this important body's perception was in step with those of the media. The international media and those providing information to it acted against The Bahamas with virtual impunity; for certainly The Bahamas had neither reach nor resources to counter such a powerful international force.
Despite the barrage of flawed reporting, The Bahamas remained undaunted in its resolve to wage a credible and effective campaign against illicit narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, in keeping with international obligations, and to cooperate with its neighbours in so doing. As any country seriously affected by drug abuse and illicit trafficking, however, the strategies and policies The Bahamas developed to counter the drug problem took as their point of departure The Bahamas national interest. The Government's unequivocal stance was that the country's problems could not be subordinate to that of any other country, nor could the terms of its countermeasures against drug abuse and illicit trafficking be dictated elsewhere.
The decision The Bahamas took in the early 1980s to integrate a multilateral dimension into its predominantly bilateral cooperation in drug control was motivated in large measure by the grave and worsening domestic drug situation, the oftentimes unrealistic expectations of what the country could and ought to be doing about it, and its thinking that action at the national and bilateral levels, in and of itself, was not a sufficient strategy for countering the drug problem. The drug problem was a trans-national one, and required a coherent international response.
Further, by internationalising its response to the drug problem, The Bahamas would be able to locate its specific problem, illicit transit trafficking, on the international drug control continuum. In that framework, it might expect a broader understanding of the drug problem as it manifested itself in the country. Speaking in the context of the responsibilities of producer and consumer states at the thirty-sixth session of the UNGA in 1981, Foreign Minister Adderley summed up The Bahamas position on multilateralism in the illicit drugs area as follows:
the primary concern of The Bahamas in this matter is for greater involvement of the United Nations system to internationalise the approaches to these problems of trafficking9
Seven years later, Foreign Minister the Hon. Clement Maynard restated this position in his address to the General Debate of the forty-third session of the UNGA, stating that:
Small states such as The Bahamas ... must rely on the multilateral approach which this world organization alone affords.10
The focus of The Bahamas efforts was therefore the United Nations, the sole universal organization, and in particular, the United Nations General Assembly's (UNGA) Third Committee (Social, Cultural and Humanitarian), the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and the CND, a Functional Commission the ECOSOC. The Bahamas strategic approach was purposeful, but was also to take unexpected turns.
The initial steps in the internationalisation of The Bahamas drug control efforts was to inform influential United Nations Member States and appropriate United Nations officials of its intention to participate actively in the work of the international drug control regime. As part of its groundwork, Foreign Minister Adderley in 1980 authorized consultations between The Bahamas Delegation to the UNGA and the Director of the United Nations Division on Narcotic Drugs (DND), Dr George Ling.
The consultations allowed The Bahamas to put on record Government's emphatically held views that: Latin America was rapidly becoming a focus for international drug traffickers; cocaine was gaining in significance globally as a drug of abuse; whereas United Nations attention had rightly focussed on Asia and the problem of opiates, and in particular, heroin, the time had come to complement the drug fight in Asia with intensified and targeted initiatives in Latin America and the Caribbean; and, in the Caribbean, emphasis should be placed on countering drug trafficking, that is, the actual movement of illicit cargoes from production to consumer centres, and in particular, the transit aspect. The principal objectives The Bahamas would pursue in international drug control would be underpinned by these considerations.
For his part, Dr Ling provided insightful data on the work of the United Nations Drug Control Units: the DND, the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) and the Secretariat of the INCB, for which Vienna, Austria, provided Headquarters. He confirmed various of The Bahamas understandings about the United Nations approach to date on the drug problem, and assured the Delegation that the DND and other drug control units stood ready to move forward on matters affecting the Caribbean and the Americas, once appropriate guidance was given by The Bahamas and other like-minded states.
The Bahamas next set its sights on the CND. The CND, established by the ECOSOC in 1946, meets in the United Nations Office at Vienna (UNOV). It is the pre-eminent forum within the United Nations for policy-making and development of proposals to strengthen international drug control, analysis of the world drug situation, and multidisciplinary discussion of every aspect of drug abuse and illicit trafficking.11 Functions are also assigned to the CND by the international drug control treaties, initially the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (the 1961 Convention),12 that Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol13 and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances (the 1971 Convention),14 and later, the 1988 Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the 1988 Convention).15 The CND reports to the ECOSOC, which discusses and approves its report. The EOCSOC in turn reports to the UNGA.
The CND's membership is drawn from among United Nations Member States and States Parties to the international drug control treaties. Membership should include countries that are important producers of opium or coca leaves, important in the manufacture of narcotic drugs, or in which drug addiction or illicit traffic is an important problem. The Bahamas met the criteria for CND membership. It was a States Party to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and that Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol (23 November 1976), and indeed, the illicit traffic constituted a serious problem. The Bahamas also acceded to the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances on 31 August 1987.
As one of three candidates endorsed by the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC), The Bahamas stood for, and won a four-year CND term, 1982-1985, in elections held by the ECOSOC on 7 May 1981. The CND would be the first Functional Commission of the ECOSOC on which The Bahamas would sit as a Member, and it would be the sole Caribbean member of the CND when it took up its seat in 1982.
Was The Bahamas surprised by the relative ease with which it secured election to the CND? Yes, it was. It would be wrong to argue that at this time, the views of Latin America and the Caribbean were central to the deliberations of the CND. As many of the United Nations pre-decolonization bodies, the CND, at that time comprising 30 members, was skewed towards the group of Western European and Others States (WEOG), with which the United States cooperated and which included the United Kingdom and Canada (10 Members). The United States, for example, had been member of the CND since its inception. It was predominantly the WEOG that exercised influence over the work of the CND in 1982. The developing countries groups: Africa (5 Members), Asia (6 Members) and GRULAC (5 Members) had proportionately less seats on the CND than their group numbers implied they should, while Eastern Europe (4 Members) was more than adequately represented. The full GRULAC membership of the CND in 1982 comprised Argentina, The Bahamas, Colombia, Mexico and Panama.16
Now poised to enter the international drug control arena, The Bahamas Government included remarks on the drug issue in the statement delivered by Foreign Minister Adderley in the General Debate of the thirty-sixth session of the UNGA in 1981. A particular issue commanded the attention of the Minister and The Bahamas Delegation in the period leading up to the delivery of the statement: included in the UNGA's provisional agenda was an item proposed by the Government of Bolivia, recognizing the need for, "an effective international campaign against traffic in drugs".17 This item accorded with The Bahamas position that illicit trafficking, including illicit transit trafficking, should be more sharply focused in international initiatives for drug control. On behalf of The Bahamas Government, Minister Adderley endorsed the Bolivian item, stating,
my Government supports the inclusion in the agenda of the Assembly at this session of the new item entitled, "International campaign against traffic in drugs.18
In a peculiar turn of events, Bolivia informed that it would not pursue the item. As the country that had endorsed the item, other Member States and the Secretariat turned to The Bahamas for clarification on the disposition of the matter. The options were straightforward - take possession of the item, or let the item fall away. The Bahamas broke new ground when Government decided to take possession of the item. Instead of supporting a sister GRULAC state in a pivotal initiative, as it was prepared to do, The Bahamas found itself as principal proponent of an item on the UNGA's agenda.
The task of drafting, negotiating and presenting a resolution on the "International Campaign against Traffic in Drugs" was an onerous one, and understandably so. The UNGA was about to adopt a resolution to put in place the "International Drug Abuse Control Strategy" and "Basic Five-year (1982-1986) Programme of Action",19 which it had instructed the CND to prepare. The United States, in particular, was of the view that adoption and implementation of the Strategy was critical, and that inherent in the Strategy was an international campaign against traffic in drugs; therefore, to pursue this matter as a separate UNGA agenda item would be counterproductive.
On the first point, the overarching importance of the Strategy, the viewpoints of the United States and The Bahamas were the same. On the second point, the presumption that a further initiative concerning illicit trafficking would be superfluous, The Bahamas and the United States viewpoints diverged. Therefore, The Bahamas proceeded with the initiative, preparing and circulating a draft resolution in the UNGA's Third Committee. In the framework of the resolution, The Bahamas took up the issue of illicit trafficking, highlighting the matter for further international attention. As Member States had not been given the opportunity to comment on the "Campaign" item prior to its inclusion in the UNGA's agenda, an important thrust of the resolution was to request governments to express themselves on an effective campaign against traffic in drugs; the Secretary-General was requested to report on the matter at the UNGA's thirty-seventh session in 1982, taking into account the comments from Government.
The next step was to identify like-minded Delegations willing to add their support to the resolution through co-sponsorship, it being clear that powerful and influential countries considered it superfluous. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) members of GRULAC gave their full cooperation and support, and co-sponsored the resolution. The Latin American member states of GRULAC were hesitant. One Latin American Delegation co-sponsored the resolution, and later removed its name from co-sponsorship. When presented to the Third Committee, the resolution had no Latin American co-sponsors.
Following on the withdrawal of co-sponsorship by the one Delegation, The Bahamas took the decision not to disclose Delegations that co-sponsored the resolution. The resolution made a significant leap forward on the road to adoption when two WEOG countries known for their commitment to the fight against illicit drugs, Australia and Sweden, agreed to co-sponsor it. Co-sponsorship was also forthcoming from among African Delegations, including an influential Morocco, and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The resolution circulated in its official draft form commanded co-sponsors from virtually every regional group.
At this juncture, the United States delegation proposed, and The Bahamas delegation agreed, to a meeting to discuss the "Strategy" and "Campaign" draft resolutions, and related matters. Congressman Benjamin Gilman led the discussion on the United States side, and A. Missouri Sherman-Peter spoke for The Bahamas. The Congressman emphasised that: significant efforts had gone into the preparation and adoption of the consensus International Drug Abuse Control Strategy, which the UNGA was now about to adopt; a new initiative might derail the Strategy; and that The Bahamas concern, the transit problem, might be incorporated elsewhere, to be taken into account in the implementation of the Strategy.
The Bahamas did not consider it an option to abandon the resolution and Delegations that had committed to it. It was convinced, further, that presenting the resolution gave the best assurance that illicit drug trafficking, and in particular, traffic in transit that was rapidly spreading in all parts of the world, would be given the focus warranted in the "Strategy" and elsewhere. The compromise agreed was that the "Campaign" resolution would be amended to recognize the "international campaign against traffic in drugs"as an integral part of the "Strategy". Likewise, the "Strategy" resolution mentioned the request for the inclusion of the item entitled, "International campaign against traffic in drugs" in the agenda of the thirty-sixth session of the UNGA. The United States explained its vote on the resolution, but did not vote against it. In fact, it is an important aspect of cooperation on the illicit drug issue that given the nature and scope of the problem, countries generally work for consensus or do not oppose, so that the resolution may be adopted without vote.
With the adoption of resolution A/RES.36/132, "International Campaign against Traffic in Drugs", The Bahamas established its credentials as a country determined and capable of acting not only in its national interest, but also in the interest of the international community, of helping to shape events, rather than being shaped by them. The Bahamas presented follow-up resolutions on the item at the UNGA's thirty-seventh session in 1983 and the thirty-eighth session in 1984. During both sessions, it resisted pressure from powerful and influential countries to remove the item from the agenda.
In the course of the thirty-ninth session in 1984, the Bolivian Delegation assumed principal sponsorship of the "Campaign" item and resolution. It continued to be the fact, however, that The Bahamas, Bolivia and other concerned delegations collaborated and cooperated closely, and that The Bahamas actively participated in the drafting, negotiation and presentation of all resolutions under this item in the period under review. This was the case after the title of the item was amended to be, "International Action to Combat Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking".20 Following the Rationalization of the Work of the Third Committee, facilitated by A. Missouri Sherman-Peter, The Bahamas Delegate to the UNGA's Third Committee, the framework item for drug matters adopted the nomenclature of the ECOSOC item, "International Drug Control". The "Campaign" continued as the subject and title of a comprehensive resolution under this item.
It is important to make two points here. The first is that in the 1980s and into the 1990s, new, major initiatives in drug control, including those presented to the CND, the ECOSOC and/or the UNGA were presented under the "International Campaign Against Traffic in Drugs", whether as item or subject/title. The second point is that much of the rigorous action in this area was proposed and/or led by states of a very proactive GRULAC.
A confident Bahamas Delegation, albeit a Delegation of one, took its seat in the CND at its Seventh Special Session in February 1982. The Bahamas had internationalised its concern regarding drug abuse and illicit trafficking, articulating it at high level in the UNGA; it was a Member of the CND; and through cooperation and collaboration, it was armed with a consensus UNGA drug control resolution calling for specific action in respect of these matters.
The CND was the strategic, expert forum The Bahamas expected it to be, providing as it did a framework for wide-ranging deliberations on the international drug control regime and the fight against illicit narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; the formulation, implementation and monitoring of international drug policy; the exchange of views and information; and the giving and receiving of mutual support. Effective membership of the CND is not possible, however, unless its complex policies, procedures and culture are mastered. For these purposes, The Bahamas Delegation diligently built coalitions, including with major influential states and states having similar priorities, established and maintained good working relations with officials of the DND, the Secretariat of the INCB, and the UNFDAC and with regional, non-governmental and other international organizations. It was visible, vocal and proactive, participating and/or leading, as appropriate, in a broad range of CND initiatives to counter the illicit drug problem.
The Bahamas established as its organizing principle for work in the drug control area the most vigorous international action possible to combat illicit transit trafficking and for special assistance to transit states, as part of overarching action to counter illicit drug trafficking. It took this organizing principle to the CND. In an expert body charged with addressing all aspects of the trans-national drug problem, however, the national interest cannot be effectively pursued unless it is balanced against the interest of other states and international obligations. Therefore, The Bahamas Delegation took on board the full range of issues before the CND: implementation of the international drug control treaties, including policies and programmes for demand reduction, to reduce illicit production, scheduling, import and export of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, and prevention, treatment and rehabilitation.
The Bahamas became a key player in the CND, in particular seizing the opportunity membership presented to represent not only its national interest, but also to pursue CARICOM's interest in arguing the case for greater focus on the illicit transit traffic in the Caribbean. At the Seventh Special Session, The Bahamas first, matter-of-fact, well-argued statement on the nature and scope of the illicit transit traffic and the grave problems it generated countered commonly held presumptions about The Bahamas drug control challenges and efforts.
The statement was striking in its impact on Delegations, Secretariat officials, the media and other participants in the CND's session. The empathy generated, expressed in terms of concern for The Bahamas and for the countries and territories in the Caribbean grappling with the illicit transit traffic problem, made it possible for The Bahamas to follow-up accomplishments on the UNGA "Campaign" resolution with a consensus CND resolution calling for "Concerted Action Against the Illicit Traffic in Central and South America and the Caribbean".21 Unlike the UNGA initiative, The Bahamas was not pressured to abandon or modify this initiative, but rather was encouraged and supported by influential CND Member States, some having colonies, territories and Departments in the Caribbean region.
CND membership and engagement, together with the UNGA and CND resolutions, laid the foundation for a period of intense activity in drug control for The Bahamas, during which it shouldered new and far-reaching responsibilities. The Bahamas became closely associated with all major drug control initiatives of the United Nations system, particularly those acclaimed as milestones in the global fight against drug abuse and illicit trafficking. The issues selected below are intended to provide, in brief, a useful compass for initiatives in which The Bahamas played an active role, and/or which were of particular concern to it.
The CND's two subsidiary organs for coordinating drug law enforcement at the regional level, both established in Asia, were of particular interest to The Bahamas. The Bahamas thinking was, as the Sub-commission on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East and the annual Meeting of Operational Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies Far East Region (HONLEA) provided important forums for cooperation in drug law enforcement in Asia, why not a HONLEA for the Caribbean region with the same objective?
The Bahamas was encouraged by the comments made by DND Director Ling in his closing statement synthesising important developments of the CND at its Seventh Special Session in 1982. Not only did he commend The Bahamas delegation for its active participation in all discussions of direct interest to the Caribbean and to Latin America, but he also stated,
The distinguished representative of The Bahamas called attention to the concern of her country as a transit point for the illicit traffic in that region... Accordingly, activities are being suggested to control the illicit traffic not only in that state, but as well as in other areas of the Caribbean.22
Just one year later, in March 1983, The Bahamas, in cooperation with the DND, hosted the First Seminar for Narcotics Law Enforcement Officers of the Anglophone Caribbean in Nassau, The Bahamas;23 The Bahamas also chaired the Seminar. The Seminar suggested to the governments of Member States represented that an item on the illicit drug traffic and related matters be placed on the agenda of the next meetings of both the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) and CARICOM. ECOSOC and the CND were also requested to endorse regular meetings of a HONLEA for the Caribbean.24
To move the HONLEA initiative forward, The Bahamas delegation at the thirty-sixth session of the UNGA in 1983, sought and received cooperation and support from like-minded delegations for inclusion in the "Campaign" resolution of a request to the Secretary-General to explore the feasibility of establishing, on a continuing basis, coordination mechanism for drug law enforcement in regions where they did not exist.25 The Bahamas also received support for the inclusion in the resolution of a proposal to convene an Interregional Meeting of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (Interregional HONLEA). The Bahamas thoughts on this matter was that such a meeting would permit a global overview and broad understanding of the illicit drug phenomenon in each region, leading to recommendations for strategies and specific measures that might be taken for a more coherent global response.
The Interregional HONLEA was convened in Vienna in July 1986, the first meeting of its kind at the global level. The Officer in Charge of the DND, Mr F. Ramos-Galino, in his opening statement to the Interregional HONLEA, attributed the convening of the Meeting to the tenacious and persistent efforts of a number of government representatives, and noted that it was being held in the context of the "Campaign" item. He went on to say that,
the particular role played ... by two Latin American and Caribbean countries, Bolivia and The Bahamas, deserves special mention, as does the fact that these two countries, taking turns, have introduced, year after year, resolutions designed to promote cooperation in this area.26
The Interregional HONLEA proposed the establishment of the regional HONLEA for Latin America and the Caribbean.27 At its thirty-second session in 1987, the CND requested the ECOSOC to recognize the Latin American and Caribbean HONLEA as a subsidiary body, similar to the two subsidiary bodies in Asia. HONLEA Africa had been established in 1985, prior to the convening of the Interregional HONLEA;28 HONLEA Latin America and the Caribbean was established in 1987;29 and HONLEA Europe was established in 1990,30 completing the circle of HONLEAS. The Bahamas had seen its interest in, and initiatives towards a system of regional HONLEAs come to fruition in less than one decade, and law enforcement officers had convened at the global level in the Interregional HONLEA for a comprehensive review of drug law enforcement countermeasures worldwide. Importantly, the illicit transit traffic was addressed on the agenda of both the interregional and regional HONLEAs.
Treaties within the United Nations system can take an agonizingly long time to be drafted, negotiated and adopted. Not so with the 1988 Convention, proposed by Venezuela in the context of the "Campaign" item to the thirty-ninth session of the UNGA in 1984.31 Initiated by the CND at its thirty-sixth session in 1985, the draft convention was completed and adopted just three years later. The Bahamas cooperation in the drafting and adoption by the UNGA's Third Committee of the resolution proposing the 1988 Convention and conveying the original Venezuelan draft convention for consideration, is a matter of record.
The Bahamas supported the drafting and adoption of a comprehensive, generally acceptable convention that would make the fight against illicit drug trafficking a more collaborative and coherent one. Initially, it was not smooth sailing for the proposal. Influential WEOG countries were not immediately convinced of the need for a new convention, which many UNGA Member States considered to be an ambitious and unworkable initiative. Alternatives suggested, primarily in informal exchanges, included a review and/or merging of the primary drug control treaties: the 1961 Convention, that Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol and the 1971 Convention; and, a possible optional protocol to the 1961 Convention.
The proposal gained momentum when a number of states, among them influential WEOG states such as the United States and Canada, determined that a convention would be a viable framework for the codification of countermeasures for drug control that the CND had been developing for some time, a number of them under WEOG leadership or with strong WEOG support. It was inevitable that issues such as forfeiture of the proceeds of drug crimes, mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, extradition, controlled delivery (a postponement of law enforcement intervention in drug trafficking) and illicit trafficking by sea and in commercial carriers would become provisions of the draft convention. The upshot was that the draft convention prepared on the UNGA's direction by the DND, with technical assistance from Canada and the United States, did not closely proximate the initial Venezuelan draft. In the fullness of time, leadership of the Venezuelan initiative became diffused, and when it later became focussed again, WEOG Member States, in particular, were on the cutting edge.
The Bahamas overarching concern was that the draft convention should have a provision that specifically addressed the special problem of transit states, an idea that did not sit well with the United States, in particular. In the CND, the view was expressed implicitly that the notion of "transit trafficking" and of "transit states" unwittingly caught up in a drug problem not of their making was essentially "accusatory". It was also opined, both implicitly and explicitly, that the escalating problem of drug abuse in states affected by illicit transit traffic was an indication that there could be no such pure "division of labour" as "transit states". It was further opined that the illicit transit traffic was part of the wider problem of illicit drug trafficking, and should not be addressed as a discrete issue. The Bahamas countered that such approaches failed to take into account the peculiar nature of illicit drug trafficking into and through the Caribbean region.
Significant hurdles had to be overcome before a transit states provision was incorporated into the draft convention. The Bahamas was somewhat handicapped in its efforts to be a driving force behind this initiative. For most of the period during which the convention was drafted and adopted, and for some time thereafter, The Bahamas had the insight and perspective of a Member State of the CND, but only the status and rights of an Observer. It had waged an ardent campaign for re-election to the CND in 1985 (as it did again in 1987), but in the reality of United Nations "high politics", its contribution to the work of the CND and international drug control generally proved to be insufficient for successful re-election. The CND had become the centre of significant international drug control action and attention, and Latin American states of GRULAC, with decidedly more diplomatic reach than The Bahamas were to contest, win, and occupy all seats allotted to the GRULAC on the CND for the better part of five years, to the exclusion of the Small Island Developing States of CARICOM. The Bahamas was next elected to the CND in 1989, and took up its seat in 1990, still the only CARICOM country on the CND.
With the right to speak, but not to present proposals or to vote in the CND, coalition building among like-minded countries became critical for The Bahamas. Partnerships were found among the States Members of the African Group: the Representative of Nigeria, for example, argued persuasively for the inclusion of the transit issue. He asserted that support for inclusion of a transit provision was enlightened self-interest for countries in which illicit production or illicit demand constituted major problems. Notwithstanding the agreement to include the transit provision, and The Bahamas submission of draft text to the DND, resistance to the transit provision continued, and no provision was included in the initial draft, for which Canada and the United States provided expert input.
Subsequently, India and other key, primarily developing countries affected by the illicit transit traffic took up the initiative.32 The Bahamas gave its unequivocal support to these efforts, the end result of which was confirmation of the decision to include a provision on transit states and the drafting and agreement of appropriate language for this purpose. Article 10, International Cooperation and Assistance to Transit States, secured its place in the draft convention, and consequently in the 1988 Convention, to the satisfaction of The Bahamas and other states concerned about the illicit transit trafficking. An important lesson was learnt as well: transit traffic could gravely impact countries in which other aspects of the illicit drug problem, including demand and/or supply, also constituted grave problems.
The 1988 Convention was adopted in a Conference of Plenipotentiaries that met in Vienna, Austria, 25 November - 20 December 1988.33 The Bahamas was among the one hundred and six states participating in the Conference. It is a measure of the recognition accorded The Bahamas proactive interest in the convention that it was elected as one of the Conference's Vice-Presidents and a member of the General Committee, responsible for reviewing the Conference's agenda. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon. Clement T. Maynard, reaffirmed The Bahamas support for the Convention in his statement to the Conference of Plenipotentiaries; The Bahamas signed the Convention on that occasion.
Important aspects of the 1988 Convention were already incorporated in The Bahamas 1987 enabling legislation.34 Therefore, immediate steps were taken to ratify the Convention. The Bahamas was the first country to do so, depositing its instrument of ratification with the United Nations Secretary General on 30 January 1989, just over a month after the adoption of the Convention. CND participants in the Thirty-third Regular Session of the CND (6-17 February 1989) were obviously taken aback by The Bahamas Delegate's announcement that The Bahamas had ratified the Convention.
Later in the session, the Under-Secretary-General and Director of the United Nations Office at Vienna, and Coordinator for Drug Matters, Miss Margaret Anstee, made a formal announcement to the CND and congratulated The Bahamas on being the first country to ratify the Convention. Delegations and Representatives of other regional and intergovernmental organizations did likewise. Early ratification put The Bahamas in a position to influence subsequent action and decisions regarding the 1988 Convention. Minister of National Security the Hon. Darrell Rolle, on behalf of The Bahamas, joined United States Attorney General, Dick Thornburgh and Miss Anstee in a New York Press Conference to mark the entry into force of the Convention in November 1990.
The ICDAIT had two important distinctions. First, the United Nations Secretary-General, H.E. Mr Perez de Cuellar, suggested its convening in a statement to the ECOSOC on 14 May 1985. A proactive GRULAC, pointing to the suggestion that had been made in A/RES/39/141 for a "Specialized Conference", ensured that the UNGA implemented the Secretary-General's proposal at its next session in 1985, by deciding to convene the ICDAIT 17-26 June 1987.35 Secondly, the ICDAIT was the first international conference to deal with questions of drug abuse and illicit trafficking, having as its objectives raising the level of world awareness of the drug problem, reinforcing the efforts of government, inter-regional governmental and non-governmental organizations in the drug field, and expressing confidence in the United Nations system to meet the drug abuse challenge.
The Bahamas was an active participant in the drafting, negotiation and presentation under the "Campaign" item of the resolution convening the ICDAIT at Ministerial level. The seminal document adopted by the ICDAIT was the Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities for Drug Abuse Control (CMO).36 This document contained four principal chapter (Prevention and Reduction of Demand; Control of Supply; Suppression of Illicit Trafficking; and Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug-dependent Persons) setting out long-term strategies, policies and activities to be carried out at all levels to significantly impact the drug problem. The multidisciplinary approach the CMO took signalled the beginning in earnest of demands and initiatives for a more balanced approach to international drug control. Until then, initiatives tended to be skewed towards control of supply and trafficking, and were centred in the developing world.
There were several noteworthy issues pertaining to ICDAIT that indicated the high regard in which the international community held Bahamas drug control efforts. Firstly, The Bahamas Observer Delegate to the CND, A. Missouri Sherman-Peter, together with three other consultants from Côte d'Ivoire, Hungary and the United States, were invited to prepare the initial draft of the CMO for CND consideration. Secondly, The Bahamas was endorsed by GRULAC, and unanimously elected as a Vice-President of the ICDAIT, for which the distinguished Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohammad, served as President.
Thirdly, notwithstanding that the ICDAIT was a Ministerial level conference, there was no objection to The Bahamas participation at the Senior Official level. That Senior Official was The Bahamas Observer Delegate to the CND and had served as consultant on the CMO. She also delivered The Bahamas principal statement to, and presided over, a session of the ICDAIT. It is critical to note, in that regard, that the ICDAIT coincided with The Bahamas National General Election in 1987, making Ministerial representation an impossibility.
In addition to the CMO, the ICDAT unanimously adopted a Political Declaration37 that expressed the will of governments to combat drug abuse and illicit trafficking, on the basis of "collective responsibility". The Bahamas Delegation was credited for its cooperation and collaboration in efforts to agree the compromise language included in the Political Declaration.
Underpinning The Bahamas proactive participation in the Seventeenth Special Session of the UNGA, convened on the recommendation of President Virgilio Barco of Colombia, was its grave concern about the virtually undeclared war into which the powerful Medellin and Cali drug cartels, in particular, had plunged Colombia. Drug cartel violence had permeated virtually all strata of Colombian society, and thousands of governmental, judicial, law enforcement and media personnel had been killed. The latest high-profile casualty had been Senator Luis Carlos Galan, a leading Colombian presidential candidate, who was assassinated on 18 August 1989. The violence had even touched the CND: in Budapest, Hungary in 1987, there had been an assassination attempt on the life of the Colombian Chair of the CND, Enrique Parejo Gonzales, a former Minister of Justice and Ambassador to Hungary.
The implications for increased illicit trafficking in cocaine into and through The Bahamas and in the Americas generally of this stepped up defiance of the authority of the Colombian state were clear to The Bahamas. The Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Sir Lynden O. Pindling, proposed to Commonwealth Heads of Government in the 1989 Kuala Lumpur CHOGM that the organization express its solidarity with the Colombian Government. It followed logically that The Bahamas would give its full support to President Barco's 1989 recommendation to the forty-fourth UNGA for a special session to:
Consider the question of international co-operation against illicit production, supply, demand, trafficking and distribution of narcotic drugs, with a view to expanding the scope and increasing the effectiveness of such cooperation.38
This would be the first special session of the General Assembly on the drug problem, and it would adopt a Political Declaration39 and Global Programme of Action (GPA).40 The Bahamas proposed, and it was agreed, to have CND expert input into the session's organization and documents, albeit that the results were not as effective as they might have been. The decision to convene the Special Session was a political one, and for these purposes, the CND's perspective more closely approximated a political than an expert one.
Also as would be expected of a Special Session recommended by a Head of State, the session generated considerable political support and expressions of solidarity in the fight against drug abuse and illicit trafficking. The Hon. Sean McWeeney, Bahamas Attorney-General, stated in The Bahamas address to the Session,
Only through co-operation can we effectively combat the powerful drug cartels which terrorize our social order and undermine our legitimate economies. The obligation to cooperate and the concept of shared responsibility in the drug war cannot be challenged.41
High-level Representatives in the Special Session urged the drafting and adoption of documents that would build on those incorporated into the international drug control regime less than three years earlier by the ICDAIT. On this matter, Attorney General McWeeney stated,
The two important documents of that conference - the Declaration and the Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline - provide a framework on which we must now build. ... A comprehensive Global Programme of Action supported by a consensus Declaration will ensure the success of this Special Session..42
A proactive Bahamas delegation brought to the GPA negotiating and drafting table hands-on experience with, and knowledge of, the CMO. It was particularly satisfied with the agreement to include in the GPA a call for international cooperation to assist and support transit states. The development of mechanisms to prevent the use of the banking system and other financial institutions for the processing or laundering of drug related money and the proclamation of the period 1991-2000 as the United Nations Decade Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, with the implementation of the GPA as its principle objective, were among other matters of particular interest to The Bahamas.
Many, especially developing countries affected by illicit production and trafficking, held the view that more had to be done to stem demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, particularly in the developed world. The Bahamas shared this view, and consequently supported the proposal for the elaboration and adoption of a new convention on demand reduction.43 Although Austria was among the leading proponents of such a convention, the idea did not gain the currency in the WEOG that would have permitted it to go forward. The perspective of a number of influential developed countries was that demand reduction was a subject for domestic jurisdiction, and could not be the subject of a binding international instrument. Notwithstanding, the numerous governments that pronounced themselves on this matter overwhelmingly urged or agreed that more determined action should be taken in the area of demand reduction.
A persuasive case was being made for a more coherent approach to, and structure for, drug control by the late 1980s, in light of the momentum generated during this period and new countermeasures that had been adopted, particularly in the 1988 Convention. The creation of a single drug control programme to implement a comprehensive, balanced and integrated strategy and to provide leadership for that purpose was virtually a foregone conclusion, when the Group of Experts to advise and assist the Secretary-General on the enhancement of the efficiency of the United Nations structure for drug abuse control was convened.44
The Bahamas supported the merger of the three drug control units: the DND, UNFDAC and Secretariat of the INCB on the merit. It took a cautious approach to the merger, however, reflecting its thinking that the presumption should not be made that a merged structure would be a more efficient one: specific organizational and operational policy guidelines needed to be more central to the debate. Minister of National Security Darrell Rolle dispelled any notion that The Bahamas did not support the merger by publicly supporting it in a statement to the UNGA's Third Committee in November 1990. He clarified, however, that the merger and subsequent restructuring should not impede implementation of essential drug control programmes.45 In essence, merged and restructured mechanism should invigorate cooperation and action for drug control, and not paralyse it, not even for a short time.
The UNDCP, which the UNGA requested the Secretary-General to create in 1991, did indeed have its early developmental challenges.46 This was to be expected; but it did avoid a prolonged period of organization, and began in a reasonable timeframe to treat with the magnititude of the drug control problem and agenda. In cooperating with the UNDCP for these purposes, The Bahamas made known its satisfaction that international drug control would, through the UNDCP, be more sharply focused, including within the United Nations system. It was also satisfied that the illicit transit traffic was among the issues to which the UNDCP would turn its attention.
Colombia, with marked support from Latin American members of GRULAC, suggested that developments in the drug control field were sufficiently urgent as to warrant discussion in a resumed forty-seventh session. At issue was the reported discontent surrounding anomalous unilateral action that had been taken to bring alleged drug traffickers to trial in countries other than their own. Such unilateral action was considered to be contrary to cooperation of the nature agreed in the United Nations Charter and to international law. The seemingly disparate focus on supply reduction over demand reduction, and developed countries setting of terms for drug control assistance that many developing countries considered conditionality, were other issues of concern.
The suggestion of a resumed UNGA session eventually gave way to agreement to hold four High-level Plenary Meetings at the next session (forty-eighth session). Coming as it did only three years after the 1990 Seventeenth Special Session, The Bahamas clearly stated its expectation that the High-level Plenary Meetings, like the Special Session, would build on, and enhance the drug control framework. The mandate of the Plenary Meetings, which The Bahamas supported, pointed towards such an outcome: "to review the international drug control situation, evaluate progress made, and adapt strategies and goals for the future".
Speaking on behalf of CARICOM states that are members of the United Nations during the High-level Plenary Meetings, The Bahamas reaffirmed the concept of "shared responsibility" for drug control, and expressed the Group's unequivocal view that drug control must fully respect international law and practice, particularly the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The Bahamas also expressed CARICOM states' advocacy for more to be done in the demand reduction area, particularly by major consuming countries, and for more creative approaches to demand reduction, including the creation of international obligations.47 These two themes: shared responsibility and a balance between supply and demand reduction ran throughout the deliberations of the High-level Plenary Meetings.
Animosities between developed and developing countries in the fight against drug abuse and illicit trafficking, which waxed and waned throughout the period under review, appeared front and centre in the lead up to the High-level Plenary Meetings, raising concerns that an undercurrent of discontent would not negatively impact them. Overall, however, there was no significant setback in multilateral cooperation, although Member States, particularly those from developing countries, adopted a cautious approach to the degree of flexibility the United Nations system, and in particular, the UNDCP, should have in taking initiatives in the drug control area, preferring stricter controls by Member States. The Bahamas endorsed this viewpoint on behalf of CARICOM states, which considered the UNDCP to be an instrument in the hands of Governments.48
It is instructive that following the dialogue and processes of the High-level Plenary Meetings, an ambitious GRULAC driven proposal to consolidate under one cover the several drug control resolutions presented by various Member States, or in which States had an interest, succeeded. Coordination of the negotiations and drafting of the omnibus resolution was entrusted to The Bahamas Delegate to the UNGA's Third Committee. The Bahamas delegation presented the resolution titled "International action to combat drug abuse and illicit production and trafficking" to the UNGA's Third Committee on behalf of Bolivia, Cuba, Mexico, the United States and The Bahamas: it was adopted by consensus. An omnibus resolution continued to be presented for the period under review.
The Bahamas regularly took the opportunity CND membership or observer status afforded to scrutinize and comment on reports and related matters, in open forum and/or in consultations, on the various documents and related matters coming before the CND. In the period under review, particular attention was paid to the Report of the INCB. Describing its method of work in its 1983 Report, the INCB commented:
In carrying out its responsibilities the Board is enjoined to act in co-operation with Governments and to maintain continuing dialogues with them in order to further the aims of the treaties. Such dialogues are pursued through regular consultations and sometimes through special missions arranged in agreement with the Government concerned.49
Initially, The Bahamas was somewhat sceptical about the INCB's reports on the Caribbean in general and The Bahamas in particular, as they persistently drew a correlation between bank secrecy laws and the financial services industry on the one hand, and illicit transit trafficking on the other. In its 1984 report, for example, the INCB stated,
Because of their geographic location and the existence of tax havens with strict bank secrecy laws, many countries in Central America and the Caribbean continue to be important transit staging centres for illicit traffic and for dubious financial operations connected with such traffic.50
The implication is that, geographic location aside, were there no tax havens with strict bank secrecy laws, there would be no transit traffic in many countries in Central America and the Caribbean. A year later, in its 1985 Report, the INCB summed up the scope of the Royal Commission "To Inquire into the Illegal Use of The Bahamas for Transhipment of Dangerous Drugs Destined for the United States of America" as follows:
to investigate allegations of widespread corruption and of the use of The Bahamas for the trans-shipment of drugs, mostly to the United States.51
While it did not say who or what made the allegations, the INCB Report went on to state that:
It was also alleged that Bahamian laws on bank secrecy were being abused increasingly by drug financiers.52
On the matter of establishing and maintaining contacts with governments, language used by the INCB in respect of its contacts with Bolivia, for example, contrasted with that used in respect of its interest in The Bahamas, and specifically the Commission of Inquiry. In respect of Bolivia, the INCB report stated: "The Board is continuing its dialogue with the Bolivian authorities and hopes to send a mission to that country in the near future.53 Of The Bahamas it stated, "The Board awaits with interest information concerning the action taken to carry out the recommendations of the Royal Commission".54
Just what was influencing the INCB's approach to The Bahamas up to 1988 was difficult to ascertain. The Bahamas delegation consulted members of the INCB and its Secretariat and spoke in open forum, but could never get a clear statement on where the information on The Bahamas was coming from. The INCB's correlation between banking secrecy, financial services and drug trafficking, in particular, seemed to be more interpretive than analytical. Its comments on the Caribbean were made at such a level of generality as to cause concern among Caribbean countries that did not fit its broad-brush presuppositions, and that would have preferred the INCB to name specifically the countries to which its Report referred.
Fully respecting the treaty-based mandate of the INCB, The Bahamas took a cooperative and proactive approach to ensure that the INCB's scrutiny and reporting on its drug control initiatives would be factual and pragmatic. In 1988, it invited an INCB Mission to evaluate The Bahamas drug control efforts, in line with its obligations under the international drug control treaties. The INCB's President, Mr Shaibzade Raoof Ali Khan, himself an experienced law enforcement officer, led the Mission. Undoubtedly the Mission left The Bahamas with a clearer appreciation for the enormity of the law enforcement and other challenges illicit transit trafficking presented to the country. With this clearer understanding, the tenor of the INCB's Report changed. For example, it indicated in its 1988 Report that:
The proximity of The Bahamas to Southern Florida and the geographical features of the archipelago are being used by trafficking organizations to smuggle through the country an important part of the cannabis and cocaine destined for the United States.55
The INCB went on to fault not baking secrecy or financial services, but "an abundance of supplies"56 as the root cause for the illicit transit traffic into and through The Bahamas. It might have added an abundance of demand, as well, but did not. In its 1989 Report, the INCB stated:
Trafficking organizations continue to take advantage of the configuration of the archipelago with its hundreds of unpopulated islands and cays, maze of channels, sounds, bays and inlets and extensive expanses of ocean to smuggle cocaine and cannabis to the United States. ... Successful operations of the Royal Bahamian Defence Force, acting independently or jointly with the United States Coast Guard, resulted in the seizure of many vessels transporting cargoes of cannabis. ... The firm commitment of The Bahamas and its exemplary co-operation with other countries is beginning to show results.57
CND participation enabled The Bahamas to make enquiries, as early as 1990, about the work of the FATF and its applicability to states that had not participated in this Group of Experts from fifteen countries, set up by the Paris Summit Meeting of the seven most industrialized countries (G-7) in 1989. The CND at its thirty-fifth session in 1992, invited Member States to make every effort to bring their national legislation into conformity with the 1988 Convention. The recommendations contained in the report of the FATF on the subject of combating the laundering of drug money was one of the elements the CND recommended be taken into account in such an exercise. The Bahamas joined members of the CND and the international community generally in accepting the FATF's recommendations. It was no doubt the acceptance of these recommendations as mutually beneficial to all states, notwithstanding the limited participation in the FATF's deliberations and conclusions, which opened possibilities for an approach to money laundering that went beyond the scope of the drug control issue.
Challenged to initiate, systematize and implement an appropriate response to drug abuse and illicit trafficking in the 1980s and into the 1990s, The Bahamas incorporated multilateralism as an essential element of that response. What The Bahamas was able to achieve in a complex and often daunting international environment had much to do with the strategic approach it took to drug control, examples of which are set out below.
The Bahamas Government determined that drug control was a national priority, and provided clearly defined, dynamic leadership within the political directorate to spearhead the national efforts. Policies were formulated, a cogent agenda set, and channels of communication were open at high level. A central organizing principle was articulated: to help generate consensus around initiatives to counter the trans-border traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, with particular emphasis on the enormity of the challenge of illicit transit trafficking and the special problems and needs of transit states. Fundamental elements of the organizing principle were reflected not in rigid rules, but as general guidelines; The Bahamas therefore had the flexibility to fully cooperate, build mutually beneficial relationships, and contribute to the full gamut of international initiatives. Such initiatives included institution building, codification of international law and the building and enhancement of international cooperative regimes and strategies to reduce the human misery and suffering inflicted by drug abuse and illicit trafficking.
The United Nations, the sole universal organization and architect and principal custodian of the international drug control regime, was made the focal point of The Bahamas drug control activism. Within this framework, The Bahamas contributed to the development and implementation of strategies, policies and programmes for global application, to be monitored and evaluated by international bodies accountable to all states. Mutually agreed global drug control policy made it less likely that powerful and influential states would impose their will on weaker states, an important consideration for small states, including The Bahamas.
While the United Nations was key to its multilateral drug control efforts, The Bahamas overall approach was a multi-forum one. It was, for example, an active participant in the April 1986 Inter-American Specialized Conference on the Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and supported the recommendation of the Conference to create the Inter-American Drug Control Commission (CICAD).58 The Bahamas has been a member of the CICAD since its inception. Its record of participation and contribution encompass other drug control initiatives in the Americas, the Commonwealth and CARICOM and those of other relevant inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations. The country's broad participation permitted it to keep its national efforts in step with its bilateral, regional and international efforts, and all efforts in step with the international drug control regime.
The Bahamas took up the challenge of leadership in the drug control area whenever possible, regardless of whether it aspired to leadership or found itself having to assume leadership, as was the case with the "Campaign" resolution. In its overall international drug control efforts, it factored in the mutual support of the countries of CARICOM and of the CARICOM Secretariat, which was pivotal to moving forward important initiatives such as the "Campaign" resolution.
The Bahamas gave its full support, and endeavoured to move forward, innovative ideas in the area of drug control presented by CARICOM countries, and endorsed by the region, whether in the CND, the ECOSOC, the UNGA and other forums. Speaking in the General Debate of the Forty-forth session of the UNGA in 1989, for example, Minister of Foreign Affairs the Hon. E. Charles Carter, supported Jamaica's proposal for a multilateral strike force and the proposal of Trinidad and Tobago for the establishment of an international criminal court with jurisdiction over persons alleged to have committed certain crimes, including drug related crimes that cut across national frontiers.59 A Bahamian consultant was Item Officer for the court proposal at the Eighth United Nations Crime Congress in Havana in 1990. Some CARICOM state's ideas, including ideas put forward by The Bahamas, may not have been implemented specifically as proposed, but the efficacy of the ideas was evident from the mutually acceptable conclusions the international community reached on them.
The Bahamas reflected the seriousness it attached to international drug control through its participation in this area at the highest possible level, including at the level of Head of Government. In addition to the pivotal forums mentioned above, The Bahamas also participated at the appropriate level in the Ministerial Conference on Drug Abuse and the Cocaine Threat held in London in 1990 and the Ministerial Meeting on the Use, Production and Trafficking in Drugs of the Inter-American system, held in Ixtapa, Mexico, in April 1990. By the 1990s, Bahamas Ministers of National Security were participating in the deliberations of the CND. Bahamas drug control statements in the UNGA and the ECOSOC, while prepared by the CND Representative, were delivered at Ambassadorial level, and exceptionally at the level of Chargé d' Affaires. Bahamians nominees for United Nations and other expert groups were prominent and accomplished senior officials in their speciality areas, and included the Governor of the Central Bank, the Commodore of the Royal Bahamas Defence Force and The Bahamas Representative/Observer to the CND.
Consistency was key to The Bahamas drug control work. Emphasis was placed on providing data from the same sources, line Ministries and Agencies, for the core group of professionals and diplomats that represented the country internationally. As a matter of course, Bahamas Representatives/Observers were required to provide advice and input for the country's reports and other documents, including for the its participation in forums other than the one to which they were accredited, and as appropriate, would be required to represent The Bahamas in such other forums. The Bahamas Representative/Observer in the CND, for example, participated in the work of the Inter-American system and in CICAD, and in various CARICOM initiatives for drug control.
The active exchange of information and ideas among professionals working in the drug control area was encouraged, where possible through arranged briefings and consultations. For example, the CND Representative/Observer was prepared for each CND meeting in a series of pre-sessional briefing conducted by relevant Ministries and Agencies including the Royal Bahamas Police Force, the Royal Bahamas Defence Force, the Central Bank of The Bahamas and the Ministry of Health. Therefore, the delegation could authoritatively represent The Bahamas position on all relevant issues before the CND. The Bahamas was also consistent in respect of the Representative(s) it accredited to principal drug control forums. The CND Representative/Observer, for example, was same for virtually the entire period under review, and represented The Bahamas across the range of United Nations bodies that take up the drug issue: the CND, ECOSOC and UNGA. Therefore, The Bahamas drug control efforts in the United Nations system were, in large measure, a continuum that permitted a high degree of coherence and effectiveness.
The Bahamas efforts to ensure consistency had multiple advantages, not the least of which was that for the most part, in all drug control forums in which it participated, its Representatives were "on the same page", so to speak. The Bahamas endeavours to field multidisciplinary delegations with requisite expertise in the drugs area, including in law enforcement, pharmacology, psychiatry and international law, also bears centrally on its efforts for consistency. It is noteworthy, in that regard, that where the country was unable to field multidisciplinary teams because of cost, human resources and other constraints, targeted reports, briefings and consultations ensured that the country's interest was effectively represented across a broad range of issues as though the experts were indeed participating.
Having determined that the CND would be the fulcrum of its drug control efforts, The Bahamas was undeterred by its 1985 and 1987 electoral defeats for a seat on the CND. It continued to participate actively in, and influence the CND's work as an Observer, as is evident from its role in, for example, the ICDAIT, the expansion of the HONLEA system and the drafting, adoption and coming into force of the 1988 Convention.
This perspective on a decade and a half of Bahamas international drug control initiatives takes 1994 as its point of departure. It does so because much of the issues over which the international community agonized in the period under review now constituted essential underpinnings of the fight against drug abuse and illicit trafficking. It had, for example, been accepted that a multilateral approach, grounded in the international drug control treaties, was essential for the effectiveness of national, bilateral and international drug control efforts. There was also consensus that such an approach had to be balanced, and multidisciplinary. Given the importance of the United Nations in the drug fight, the ECOSOC was set to examine the status of cooperation in international drug control within the system, at its coordination segment in 1994.
The Bahamas entered the international drug control arena in the early 1980s intent on making its singular contribution towards, and to cooperate in, initiatives to address a grave trans-national problem, in its national interest and in keeping with its international obligations. As matters transpired, it entered at a critical juncture, as cocaine gained in significance as a drug of abuse and the Americas paid the high price that comes with illicit production, trafficking and demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
The circumstances prevailing in the Latin America and the Caribbean gave cause to GRULAC countries, The Bahamas among them, to play their essential role in a dynamic process for drug control, which strengthened global strategies, policies and programmes not only in the Americas, but globally. The pivotal initiatives GRULAC countries presented, negotiated and supported not only contributed towards a more coherent and targeted international drug abuse fight, but also helped to conciliate divergent interest and make the CND a more collegial body.
The concept of "shared responsibility" in the fight against drug abuse and illicit trafficking gained currency, and continued to do so. Significant progress was being made in areas including confiscation of the proceeds of drug crimes, extradition and in countering money laundering, as countries signed, ratified and/or adhered to the 1988 Convention, and adopted and amended legislation for these purposes. A network of law enforcement meetings, the regional HONLEAs was operational, enhancing law enforcement cooperation in countering drug abuse and illicit trafficking.
When the objectives The Bahamas outlined in its consultations with DND Director George Ling in 1980 are reviewed - joining the international fight against drug abuse in earnest and focussing international attention on the drug problem in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly illicit trafficking and transit trafficking in cocaine and cannabis - The Bahamas had cause to be relatively satisfied with how international action to combat drug abuse and illicit trafficking had developed between 1980-1994, as the following selective comments would indicate.
The Executive Director of the UNFDAC, speaking before the Thirtieth Session of the CND in 1983, stated,
In the past, most of UNFDAC's resources and attention has been devoted to activities in the field of opiates. Now, however, the Fund was ready to meet the challenge of cocaine abuse and traffic.60
Under Secretary-General, Director General of United Nations Office at Vienna and Coordinator for Dug Control, Miss Margaret Anstee, speaking before the ECOSOC in 1989 regarding drug control initiatives, stated,
The most recent expansion has concentrated on regions where the Fund had had a minimal presence in the past - Africa and the Caribbean, which are now been confronted with increasing drug problems.61
In their Communiqué concluding the CHOGM in Kuala Lumpur 18-24 October 1989, Commonwealth Heads of Government,
expressed their deep concern at the serous threat posed by drug abuse and illicit trafficking and the special problems caused to states which had become transit points for illicit trafficking.62
Speaking on behalf of the European Community and its twelve member states in the Seventeenth Special Session of the UNGA in February 1990, Mr Ray Burke, T.D., Minister of Justice of Ireland commented,
It is appropriate at this point to pay a special tribute to those states, among them several Latin American countries, which, often in very difficult circumstances, have waged a determined campaign to eliminate the illicit production and transit of drug from and through their territories.
In respect of the HONLEA system, Mr Burke stated,
we also attach importance to the work done by ...the various HONLEA systems.
It is noteworthy, also, that a broad range of organizations, agencies and meetings took up the transit issue. These included the Inter-American Specialized Conference, the Interregional and Regional HONLEAS, the UNDCP, and as indicated above, the Commonwealth. In particular, The Bahamas was pleased that international involvement in the GRULAC region, especially by the UNFDAC, increased significantly in the period covered by this perspective, with an office was established in Barbados.
Unfortunately, financing the United Nations drug control initiatives proved to be a challenge throughout much of the period. While language introduced by the United States for the delivery of drug policies and programmes "within available resources" may have been intended to ensure the most cost effective use of resources, it was not always possible to implement agreed strategies in that limited context, thus increasing reliance on extra budgetary resources. Further, animosity and conflict continued to flare up from time to time, particularly when judgemental positions led to undue criticism, "blame and shame" or divisive unilateral action. Such, regrettably, is the nature of the illicit drug problem, as action or inaction in, or by, one state can have profound consequences in another.
As a Small Island Developing State, The Bahamas can justifiably be satisfied with the outcome of its active engagement in the drug abuse fight 1980-1994, and in particular, its association with major achievements considered milestones in the area of international drug control. Unquestionably its contribution gave the country influence beyond that its size would imply. The Bahamas, however, remained consistent in its position that in an area so potentially destructive and divisive, it is best to view drug control accomplishments and The Bahamas its contribution to them in terms of progress, but never in terms of success.
1 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1983, p. 2 Para 7.
2 Bruce Michael Bagley, Dateline Drug Wars: Colombia: The Wrong Strategy in Foreign Policy Number 77, Winter 1989-1990.
4 Assistant Superintendent Basil Dean, Royal Bahamas Police Force, statement before the thirty-first session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on Situation and Trends in Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking.
6 Statement by the Prime Minister of The Bahamas, the Rt. Hon. Lynden O. Pindling on "Functional Cooperation", Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 18-24 October 1989.
7 Royal Bahamas Police Force data.
8 Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed to inquire into the illegal use of The Bahamas for the transhipment of dangerous drugs destined for the United States of America, October 1983-December 1994; Nassau, The Bahamas 1984.
10 A/43/PV.24, 11 October 1988.
12 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 520, No. 7515.
13 Ibid., vol. 976, No. 14152.
14 Ibid., vol. 1019, No. 14956.
16 CND enlarged to 53 Member States in 1991: Africa 11; Asia 11; GRULAC 10; WEOG 14; Eastern Europe 6; 1 seat rotating between Africa and Asia.
18 A/36/PV.27, 6 October 1981.
20 A/44/434; 82nd Plenary Meeting; 15 December 1989.
21 E/CN.7/L.538 - France, the United Kingdom and the United States co-sponsored the resolution.
22 Statement of the Director of the Division on Narcotic Drugs, Dr. George Ling, summarizing the work of the Seventh Special Session of the CND.
23 In A/RES/38/122 of 16 December 1983, thanks are extended to The Bahamas for having hosted this Seminar.
24 DND/WP. 1983/6; 14 April 1983.
26 Opening Statement of the Office in Charge of the DND, Mr. F. Ramos-Galino, at the first Interregional HONLEA, Vienna, Austria, July 1986.
27 Recommendations of the First Interregional Meeting of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies: A/41/559; 3 September 1986, paragraph 19; E/CN.7/1987/3; 18 August 1986.
32 India introduced Article 6 Bis. to expand the provisions concerning the transit problem.
34 The Tracing and Forfeiture of the Proceeds of Drug Trafficking Act of 1987.
36 Report of the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, Vienna, 17-26 June 1987 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.87.1.18), chap. 1, Sect. B.
39 United Nations General Assembly Seventeenth Special Session, Resolution S-17/2 of 23 February 1990.
41 A/S-17/PV.1, pages 52 & 53.
45 A/C.3/45/SR.29 of 2 November 1990, page 8, paragraph 27.
47 A/PV/48/37 of 26 October 1993.
49 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1983, Foreword, para 1.
50 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1984, p. 41 para 196.
51 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1985, p. 45 para 229.
53 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1984, p. 38 para 181.
54 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1985, p. 46 para 230.
55 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1988, p. 27 para 125.
56 Ibid. page 27, paragraph 125.
57 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1989, p. 31, paragraph 159 & 160.
58 Final Act of Rio De Janeiro (Programme of Action); Chapter IV.
59 A/44/PV.25 of 13 October 1989.
60 CND Report on the Thirtieth Session, 7-16 February 1983, ECOSOC Official Records 1983, Supplement No. 5, United Nations, New York 1983.
62 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia p. 23 paragraph 2.
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